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ABSTRACT 
 
This research examined the concept of base erosion and profit shifting in the context 
of tax schemes employed by multinational corporations. The objective of this thesis 
was to identify weaknesses within South Africa’s income tax legislation, based on 
these schemes, and further to propose recommendations to counter the occurrence 
of base erosion and profit shifting by multinational companies. The research also 
comprised of a limited review of current global and South African initiatives to 
address the problem of base erosion and profit shifting. It was concluded that there 
are a number of weaknesses in the definitions and provisions of the South African 
income tax legislation that need to be addressed in order to reduce base erosion and 
profit shifting. Brief recommendations were proposed in relation to each of the 
weaknesses, in order to address them. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. THE CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH 
 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(hereinafter referred to as the OECD), the term ―base erosion and profit shifting‖ 
refers to tax planning strategies which exploit gaps and mismatches in tax 
legislation. This encompasses the shifting of company profits to locations where tax 
legislation in those countries allows for little or no corporate tax to be paid (OECD: 
Online).  
 
The following extract as stated by Adam Smith (1776: 676) substantiates the 
premise that base erosion and profit shifting creates a problem in the context of tax 
equality in any state: 
 
The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the 
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; 
that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the 
protection of the state. The expense of government to the individuals of a 
great nation is like the expense of management to the joint tenants of a great 
estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective 
interests in the estate. In the observation or neglect of this maxim, consists 
what is called the equality or inequality of taxation. 
 
Tax inequality is an aspect of what is termed the ―tax gap‖, which is defined by the 
South African Revenue Service (hereinafter referred to as the SARS) as ―the 
difference between the amount of taxes the Government should collect and the 
amount of taxes the Government actually collects‖ (National Treasury, 2013a: 183). 
Although the causes of the tax gap are many, it is submitted that one of the 
contributors is base erosion and profit shifting. 
 
According to the latest statistics (National Treasury, 2013a: 9) available from the 
SARS, it is evident that the greatest contributor towards tax revenue is income tax. 
The collections of income tax can be further split into personal income tax and 
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company income tax. The breakdown in terms of the SARS statistics reflects that the 
major portion of Income Tax is collected from individual taxpayers. Although causal 
factors identified for the low contribution from companies are the decrease in 
company profits due to declining global and domestic demand, as well as the 
utilisation of assessed losses accumulated during the economic downturn (National 
Treasury, 2013a: 2), part of the significant imbalance in the relative contributions, 
could be attributable to the utilisation of complex schemes by companies to reduce 
their tax burden.  
 
The phenomenon of ―globalisation‖ has resulted in significant and rapid changes to 
the economic environment. The OECD defines the term ―globalisation‖ as 
―increasing internationalisation of financial markets and of markets for goods and 
services . . .‖ and refers to a process of economic integration, whereby ―national 
resources become internationally mobile while national economies become 
increasingly interdependent.‖ (OECD, 2005: 11) 
 
From a South African economic perspective, the benefits of globalisation are evident 
in the form of increased foreign direct investment, which is a key factor for any 
developing country, as it supports growth and boosts the economy. However, the 
emergence of globalisation in the economic environment has led to the recognition of 
the need to eliminate the effects of double taxation, arising from the interaction 
between different tax systems across countries (OECD, 2013a: 7). Hence 
international tax law is considered to be an important consideration in the support of 
globalisation and foreign direct investment.  
 
The growth of the global economy has led to the establishment of various 
multinational enterprises such as Google, Apple Inc. and Facebook. Such 
companies are major providers of what is known as the ―digital product‖, which refers 
to products or services supplied through the internet. This results in many companies 
being able to engage in trade and business activities across a vast number of 
countries without having a physical presence in the countries. As a result of the 
emergence of this ―digital economy‖, many multinational enterprises are able to 
structure their tax affairs so as to significantly minimise their tax burdens by making 
use of ―loopholes‖ in international tax law. This is one aspect of base erosion and 
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profit shifting which is currently under scrutiny by the OECD and as a result of the 
recent focus on this issue, the OECD has emerged with an action plan to address 
base erosion and profit shifting (OECD, 2013a: 7-14).   
 
Although South Africa does not form part of the OECD, it is a member country of the 
Group of 20 (hereinafter referred to as the G20), which is a forum for international 
economic co-operation and decision-making. On 19 June 2012, the G20 Leaders 
Declaration stated: ―We reiterate the need to prevent base erosion and profit shifting 
and we will follow with attention the ongoing work of the OECD in this area‖ (G20, 
2012: Online). Furthermore, the G20 2014 Agenda includes a focus on tax 
avoidance, particularly base erosion and profit shifting, in order to ensure that profits 
are taxed in the location where the economic activity takes place (G20, 2014: 
Online). 
 
The former Minister of Finance for South Africa, Pravin Gordhan, announced in the 
2013 Budget Speech, that a tax review would be initiated to assess the tax policy 
framework. On 17 July 2013, the terms of reference (National Treasury, 2013b: 
Online) for the Tax Review Committee (the Davis Tax Committee) were set out, with 
one area of focus being base erosion and profit shifting. The Davis Tax Committee 
recognises that there is an immediate need to address concerns relating to base 
erosion and profit shifting, in the context of corporate income tax, as identified by the 
OECD and the G20 (The Davis Tax Committee, 2013: Online). 
 
It is evident that the issue of base erosion and profit shifting is one that is currently 
receiving worldwide attention, and it is likely that the OECD and G20 countries will 
work together in trying to address this problem. The implementation of any changes 
to legislation as suggested by the OECD will, however, have to be considered within 
the context of South African tax legislation, which is governed by the Income Tax 
Act, 58 of 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Income Tax Act). 
 
The SARS Strategic Plan for 2013/14 to 2017/18 (SARS: 2013b) (hereinafter 
referred to as the SARS Strategic Plan), states that it should be ensured that tax 
compliant citizens are not shouldering the tax burden of others who benefit from the 
country’s infrastructure and resources without paying their fair share of taxes. The 
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SARS Strategic Plan further makes reference to the global tax environment, in which 
sophisticated tax schemes are on the rise, leading to a perceived unfair erosion of 
the tax base. The following three risks are specifically mentioned in the SARS 
Strategic Plan (SARS, 2013b: 18): 
 
 Global economic uncertainty has resulted in multinational companies seeking 
―innovative‖ ways to protect profitability and their returns to shareholders by 
reducing their tax burden. 
 The growing presence of multinational corporations in South Africa, which 
account for nearly seventy per cent of worldwide trade, has the greatest ability 
to shift profits from high tax jurisdictions to low tax jurisdictions. 
 Developing countries, such as South Africa, are likely to be the most impacted 
by transfer pricing manipulations as the current OECD and United Nations 
transfer pricing frameworks are seen to favour developed countries. 
 
A recent article published by Business Tech (2014: Online) entitled ―Naspers hits out 
at Google over tax dodge‖ brought further attention to the issue of profit shifting by 
multinational companies. Naspers (a South African listed media company), through 
its subsidiary 24.com, expressed concern over Google’s competitive advantage 
through its ability to avoid paying tax in South Africa. The article further states that 
the tax practices of Google have come under scrutiny in other countries such as the 
United Kingdom (hereinafter referred to as the UK) and France. Google’s current 
online advertising revenue in South Africa is estimated to be between R800 million 
and R1 billion, and based on these figures, the article projects the lost tax revenue 
from Google to be around R140 million in corporate taxes, and a further R100 million 
in employees’ tax. The complainant, 24.com, further stated that significant legislative 
changes are required in order for South African internet businesses to remain 
competitive with their global counterparts.   
 
The focus on the above issues and the current publicity surrounding the taxation of 
multinational enterprises influences tax morale. If there is a perceived imbalance in 
the tax burden, it is submitted that compliant taxpayers are likely to be discouraged 
by the evident inequality in taxation. This is one of the reasons for the decision to 
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research the issue of base erosion and profit shifting in this thesis, specifically in 
relation to multinational corporations.  
 
Although the schemes employed by multinational companies may be legal, they 
exploit current ―loopholes‖ in international tax legislation, and the OECD (Online) has 
identified the following further impacts arising out of base erosion and profit shifting: 
 
 Multinational enterprises are able to reduce their tax burdens, thus realising a 
higher net profit after tax – this gives such companies a competitive 
advantage over companies which operate at a domestic level. 
 The occurrence of base erosion and profit shifting may lead to an inefficient 
allocation of resources, by influencing investment decisions towards activities 
that have lower pre-tax rates of return, but higher after-tax rates of return. 
 
The discussion above illustrates how base erosion and profit shifting may impact on 
the tax revenues collected by tax authorities, tax morale, as well as on the economy 
of a country, and this further supports the need for research on this issue. 
 
1.2. GOALS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The research question therefore relates to the nature of the tax structures employed 
by multinational corporations and how these structures reveal the underlying 
weaknesses in South Africa’s tax legislation, as governed by the Income Tax Act. 
 
The primary goal of the research is to determine how the tax structures adopted by 
multinational companies uncover weaknesses in South Africa’s current tax legislation 
and to identify tax changes that will assist in reducing the occurrence of base erosion 
and profit shifting in relation to multinational enterprises. In carrying out the main 
objective of this research, the following sub-goals are addressed: 
 
 a detailed examination of the concept of base erosion and profit shifting, 
including an overview of associated concepts such as harmful tax 
competition, tax havens and preferential tax regimes;  
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 a review of the provisions enacted within South African tax legislation to 
address international tax consequences, including a brief examination of 
double tax agreements; 
 a study of tax structures adopted by well-known multinational companies and 
an illustration of the estimated loss in tax revenue (for certain countries) 
arising out of the profit shifting by such companies; and 
 a review of current initiatives to reduce the occurrence of base erosion and 
profit shifting, including that of the OECD, other country-specific initiatives, as 
well as efforts made within South Africa. 
 
1.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
 
An interpretative research approach has been adopted for the present research as it 
seeks to understand and describe (Babbie & Mouton: 2009). The research 
methodology to be applied can be described as a doctrinal research methodology. 
This methodology provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a 
particular legal category (in the present case the legal rules relating to international 
tax), analyses the relationships between the rules, explains areas of difficulty and is 
based purely on documentary data (McKerchar: 2008).  The documentary data used 
for the research consists of: 
 
 South African income tax legislation and relevant case law; 
 international taxing acts and associated case law;  
 SARS Interpretation Notes, Regulations, Notices, Binding Rulings in relation 
to aspects of international tax; and 
 textbooks and other writings. 
 
The research is conducted in the form of an extended argument, supported by 
documentary evidence. The validity and reliability of the research and the 
conclusions is ensured by: 
 
 adhering to the rules of the statutory interpretation, as established in terms of 
statute and common law; 
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 placing greater evidential weight on legislation, case law which creates 
precedent or which is of persuasive value (primary data) and the writings of 
acknowledged experts in the field; 
 discussing opposing viewpoints and concluding, based on a preponderance of 
credible evidence; and 
 the rigour of the arguments. 
 
The multinational companies selected for further study are as follows:  
 
 Apple Inc. – as this is the company which pioneered a popular profit-shifting 
scheme known as ―double Irish with a Dutch sandwich‖, which is commonly 
adopted by other multinational enterprises (Haden, 2012: Online);  
 Google – due to the recent allegations made against this company, both in 
international (Campbell, 2014: Online) and South African (Business Tech, 
2014: Online) media releases; 
 Starbucks – as this company has been a recent point of focus by the tax 
authorities in the UK, which has revealed various tax schemes utilised by the 
company to avoid taxes (Bergin, 2012: Online) and  
 SABMiller – as ActionAid, a global human rights organisation, published a 
report in 2010, revealing various tax avoidance schemes adopted by the 
company, mainly affecting developing African countries (ActionAid, 2010: 
Online). 
 
The research does not attempt to quantify the loss in tax revenue for South Africa 
(arising from base erosion and profit shifting by multinational companies), as no 
formal quantification studies were found to have been undertaken by the South 
African tax authorities. Furthermore, the research does not consider any 
recommendations made by the Davis Tax Committee as no reports on base erosion 
and profit shifting were published before the completion of this research. 
 
As all the data is in the public domain, no ethical considerations arise. Interviews are 
not conducted; opinions are considered in their written form. Privileged information 
arising in the course of the writer’s employment does not form part of this research. 
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1.4. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
 
This chapter provided an introduction to the area of research and provided a brief 
background to the research. The scope of the research was discussed, as well as 
the goals and sub-goals to be achieved. The methodology applied in conducting the 
research was set out, and the companies selected for the purposes of the research 
were identified.  
 
Chapter Two focuses on the concept of base erosion and profit shifting, as well as 
other important associated issues such as harmful tax competition, tax havens and 
preferential tax regimes. A brief background to these issues is provided, as well as a 
discussion of the effects of base erosion and profit shifting. 
 
Chapter Three provides a detailed analysis of the South African Income Tax Act in 
relation to international tax. This includes a review of concepts such as source, 
residence, controlled foreign companies, permanent establishment, place of effective 
management and transfer pricing, with reference to case law where necessary. 
Double tax agreements are also discussed.  
 
Chapter Four reviews schemes employed by multinational companies to reduce their 
respective tax burdens – and the associated weaknesses that the schemes reveal in 
the provisions of the Income Tax Act that address international tax consequences. 
An illustration is provided of the estimated tax revenue that has been lost in certain 
tax jurisdictions, due to these schemes. Other strategies used by multinational 
companies to shift profits are also discussed insofar as they are not included in the 
case studies conducted. 
 
Chapter Five focuses on current initiatives aimed at reducing base erosion and profit 
shifting. This includes a review of the OECD’s action plan which addresses the tax 
challenges arising from multinational corporations. Current South African initiatives 
are also discussed, including progress made by the Davis Tax Committee in 
addressing the problem of base erosion and profit shifting in relation to multinational 
enterprises. Changes implemented or tabled by other countries (insofar as they are 
considered relevant in addressing the weaknesses identified) are also discussed. 
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Suggestions by the OECD are critically reviewed from a South African economic 
perspective, due to the need to maintain a balance between tax reform and attracting 
foreign direct investment. 
 
Chapter Six draws on the findings of the previous chapters, and provides 
conclusions and recommendations in relation to potential improvements to South 
Africa’s income tax legislation in relation to international tax issues, which would 
contribute towards ensuring that multinational corporations pay their fair share of 
income tax in the country. In addition, this chapter sets out the limitations of the 
research undertaken and makes suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE CONCEPT OF BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the concepts of harmful tax competition, tax havens, 
preferential tax regimes and harmful tax practices, all of which are important issues 
which need to be considered in understanding the dynamic underlying base erosion 
and profit shifting. Once these issues are discussed in sufficient detail, base erosion 
and profit shifting forms the core focus of the chapter.  
 
The chapter therefore addresses the first goal of the research: to provide a detailed 
examination of the concept of base erosion and profit shifting, including an overview 
of associated concepts such as harmful tax competition, tax havens and preferential 
tax regimes. 
 
2.2. HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION 
 
Historically, the development of tax legislation was undertaken with a focus on the 
requirements of the domestic economy of a country. The limited mobility of capital 
previously meant that the interaction of domestic tax systems between countries was 
not a common occurrence. However, the emergence of globalisation and its 
significant growth has had the effect of increasing the integration between the 
economies of different countries, due to the increase in the mobility of capital. This 
has fundamentally changed the manner and frequency of the interaction of tax 
systems across a number of countries. As a result of the emergence of the global 
economy, many governments have attempted to increase foreign investment by 
minimising the taxation levels and/or providing more favourable tax policies as 
compared to other countries (OECD, 1998: 13). 
 
Tax competition exists when capital and/or labour can be shifted from high tax 
jurisdictions to low tax jurisdictions in order to reduce tax burdens (Mitchell, Online: 
1). However, in the context of base erosion and profit shifting, it is submitted that tax 
competition also refers to competition between tax jurisdictions in order to attract 
investment into the country by lowering tax rates or providing other tax incentives. It 
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can therefore be seen as a competition between countries for taxing rights (Calich, 
2011: 44). In summary, tax competition can occur through the tax strategies 
employed by companies to reduce their tax burdens, but can also occur through the 
tax policies adopted by countries in order to attract investment. 
 
The above discussion provided a brief background to the phenomenon of tax 
competition. However, an important consideration is: what renders tax competition 
harmful? A report published by the OECD (1998: 14) highlighted the negative effects 
of tax competition, and stated that it potentially distorts the patterns of trade and 
investment, and can reduce global welfare. Tax competition can further erode 
national tax bases of countries. The report further clarified that investors in tax haven 
countries who are residents in non-haven countries benefit from public spending and 
the infrastructure of their resident countries, yet avoid contributing to the financing 
required by these countries. It is important to note that tax competition is not always 
harmful and in many ways, has contributed towards positive tax reform. However, for 
the purposes of discussing this issue in the context of base erosion and profit 
shifting, it is only considered necessary to explore tax competition insofar as it is 
considered to be harmful. Positive tax competition is considered to be beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
 
2.3. TAX HAVENS AND PREFERENTIAL TAX REGIMES 
 
2.3.1. TAX HAVENS 
 
The key feature of a tax haven is that its laws can be used to evade or avoid the tax 
regulations of other jurisdictions. Tax havens generally have laws specifically 
designed for the purpose of minimising a tax liability, aiming to attract financial 
investment, with one of the main elements of attractiveness being strong secrecy 
provisions which prevent the effective exchange of information (Tax Justice Network, 
2007: 1). According to the OECD (1998: 21), a tax haven is generally defined as a 
jurisdiction where certain taxes are levied at a low rate or not at all. There are 
numerous features which have been identified as being indicative of a tax haven. For 
the purposes of this thesis, the characteristics identified by the OECD are discussed 
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further. The four key factors identified by the OECD (1998: 22-23) in classifying a 
jurisdiction as a tax haven are as follows: 
 
a) No taxes or nominal taxes – consideration is given to whether a jurisdiction 
imposes no or nominal taxes and offers itself (or is perceived to do so) as a 
place that can be used by non-residents to escape tax in their country of 
residency;  
b) Lack of effective exchange of information - typically this is through laws or 
administrative practices which protect individuals and businesses against 
scrutiny by foreign tax authorities; 
c) Lack of transparency – this is with reference to the operation of the legislative, 
legal or administrative provisions of the jurisdiction; and 
d) No substantial activities – the absence of substantial activity may be indicative 
that a jurisdiction may be attempting to attract investment or transactions that 
are purely tax driven. 
 
Subsequent to the issuance of the report which listed the above factors, the OECD 
focus in relation to tax havens shifted (OECD, 2001: 10) to the aspect of information 
exchange. However, for the purpose of the understanding tax havens in relation to 
base erosion and profit shifting, all of the above factors are considered to be 
relevant. 
 
2.3.2. PREFERENTIAL TAX REGIMES 
 
A preferential tax regime does not have any formal definition, but refers to a tax 
system which has features constituting harmful tax competition (OECD, 1998: 20). 
The OECD (1998: 27) has also identified key features of tax regimes which suggest 
that they have the potential to constitute harmful tax competition. These factors are 
as follows: 
 
a) No or low effective tax rates – this may arise because the relevant tax rate is 
very low or because of the way in which a country defines the tax base to 
which the rate is applicable; 
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b) ―Ring-fencing‖ of regimes – this can be effected in various ways including the 
exclusion of resident taxpayers from participating in the regimes offered, or 
the prohibition of enterprises which benefit from the regime, from participating 
in the domestic market. Such ―ring-fencing‖ indicates that the regime has the 
potential to create harmful effects, as the tax jurisdiction offering the regime 
needs to protect its own economy from the regime, thereby resulting in an 
adverse impact on foreign economies and tax bases; 
c) Lack of transparency – this may arise from the way in which a regime is 
designed and administered. Non-transparency includes favourable 
application of laws and regulations, negotiable tax provisions and a number 
of other practices; and 
d) Lack of effective exchange of information – this is a strong indication that a 
country is engaging in harmful tax competition.  
 
There are a number of other factors identified by the OECD. However, for the 
purposes of this thesis, it is not considered necessary to discuss these additional 
factors. The above discussion is considered to be sufficient in creating a basic 
understanding of the concept of preferential tax regimes and the factors which 
characterise these regimes. 
 
2.4.  HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES 
 
According to the OECD (1998: 16), the term ―harmful tax practices‖ is the collective 
reference to tax havens and preferential tax regimes, which can be said to have 
negative effects on the tax systems of other countries. Practices which drive the 
effective tax rate levied on income from mobile activities significantly below the rates 
in other countries may cause harm by: 
 
 distorting financial and, indirectly, real investment flows; 
 undermining the integrity and fairness of tax structures; 
 discouraging compliance by taxpayers; 
 re-shaping the desired level and mix of taxes and public spending; 
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 causing undesired shifts of part of the tax burden to less mobile tax bases, 
such as labour, property and consumption; and 
 increasing the administrative costs and compliance burdens on tax authorities 
and taxpayers. 
(OECD, 1998: 16) 
 
The process of identifying harmful tax practices involves a number of factors, and the 
extent of the harm caused will, no doubt, vary in degrees. If the effects of tax 
practices adopted by a particular jurisdiction are so substantial that they are 
concluded to be poaching the tax bases of other jurisdictions, such practices would 
be labelled as ―harmful tax competition‖ (OECD, 1998: 16). This concept was 
discussed above, and it is submitted that the relationship between the issues 
discussed in this chapter have been sufficiently demonstrated to an extent that is 
necessary to link them to the concept of base erosion and profit shifting. 
 
2.5. BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 
 
2.5.1. BACKGROUND 
 
The economic landscape has changed drastically over a number of years, primarily 
due to globalisation, which increased the integration across various economies and 
markets. Globalisation has resulted in increased mobility of capital and labour, the 
gradual removal of trade restrictions and barriers, and significant strides in 
technological and telecommunication developments (OECD, 2013b: 25). This has 
resulted in increasing levels of interaction between tax systems across different 
countries. 
 
Corporate tax is levied in terms of domestic tax legislation. As stated previously, the 
development of tax legislation was undertaken with a focus on the requirements of 
the domestic economy of a country. The interaction between domestic tax systems 
can lead to an overlap, potentially resulting in income which can be taxed in more 
than one jurisdiction, which is known as ―double taxation‖. However, the interaction 
of tax systems also leaves gaps which have not been addressed by tax legislation, 
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thus resulting in ―double non-taxation‖. Corporations often exploit differences in 
domestic tax rules and international standards in order to reduce their tax burden 
(OECD, 2012a: 2). 
 
It is considered necessary to re-iterate the definition of the term ―base erosion and 
profit shifting‖ adopted by the OECD – which refers to tax planning strategies that 
exploit gaps and mismatches in tax legislation. This encompasses the shifting of 
profits to locations where the tax legislation in those countries allows for little or no 
taxes to be paid (OECD: Online). The gaps and mismatches referred to in this 
definition, arise from the failure to reform tax legislature to address the effects of the 
global economy that have emerged over the years. This has led to the problem of 
the current tax provisions being inadequate to address the global business 
environment under which multinational companies operate. This enables 
multinational corporations to create or adopt tax strategies which allow for profits to 
be shifted to jurisdictions where little or no tax is payable, thereby eroding the tax 
base of the country in which such corporation is resident. 
 
There is a perception that substantial corporate tax revenue is lost due to base 
erosion and profit shifting. As discussed in Chapter One, this issue has been 
receiving attention on a global scale and various commitments have been made by 
organisations such as the OECD and the G20, as well as by specific countries, 
including South Africa, to address this problem. 
 
Base erosion represents a serious risk to tax revenues, tax sovereignty, as well as 
tax fairness (both actual and perceived fairness) of all countries affected by this 
issue. There are many ways in which a country’s tax base can be eroded, but a 
significant cause of base erosion is profit shifting (OECD, 2013b: 5). It is submitted 
that the shifting of profits by companies can be achieved both through the 
exploitation of gaps in current tax legislation, as well as through the use of tax 
havens and preferential tax regimes. In some instances, companies may employ a 
combination of the above strategies in order to minimise their tax burden. The 
strategies used by multinational corporations are studied in further detail in Chapter 
Four of this document. 
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2.5.2. EFFECTS OF BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 
 
The occurrence of base erosion and profit shifting has a number of adverse effects 
on different aspects within a country. Some of the consequences identified by the 
OECD (2013a: 8) are: 
 
● Governments are harmed – this is attributable to lower tax revenues and 
increased costs to ensure compliance. Furthermore, the perception by the 
public that corporations are not paying their fair share of taxes undermines the 
integrity of the tax system. With regard to developing countries, the reduced 
tax revenue can lead to under-funding of public investment that is required for 
economic growth. 
 Individual taxpayers are harmed – as discussed in Chapter One, individual 
taxpayers contribute a greater portion towards overall income tax revenue (in 
South Africa). In instances where this is due to the strategies employed by 
companies to shift income away from their country of residence and thereby 
reduce their tax burden, this is unfair to individual taxpayers. This has the 
potential to lead to a decrease in tax morale amongst individual taxpayers. 
 Businesses are harmed – multinational corporations seen to be engaged in 
base erosion and profit shifting may suffer reputational risk. Furthermore, 
corporations which operate only in the domestic market may have difficulty in 
maintaining competitiveness in relation to multinational companies that have 
the ability to shift profits to reduce tax. Therefore, base erosion and profit 
shifting can be said to distort fair competition between businesses. 
 
Further, it has been stated that the occurrence of base erosion and profit shifting 
may lead to the inefficient allocation of resources, as investment decisions are 
inclined towards activities that have lower rates of return before tax, but higher after-
tax rates of return (OECD, 2013b: 8). 
 
These consequences of base erosion and profit shifting indicate that this problem is 
potentially harmful to the economy of a country, as well as to individuals and other 
businesses. In addition, tax morale and investment decisions can be negatively 
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influenced by this issue. The potential negative impact on tax morale represents an 
additional challenge for the tax authorities in any country, as there are various 
studies which reflect that there is a significant correlation between tax morale and tax 
compliance, in both developing and developed countries (OECD, 2013c: 2). 
Therefore, a decline in levels of tax morale could result in decreased levels of tax 
compliance, thereby further lowering amounts of tax revenue collected by tax 
authorities. 
 
2.6. CONCLUSION 
 
To summarise, the globalisation of international trade and investment and the failure 
of tax legislation to take account of this, has resulted in the ability of multinational 
corporations to have a legal presence in a number of countries around the world, 
each with different tax, accounting and corporate law regimes. This has given rise to 
tax arbitrage and profit shifting opportunities, which are exploited by various 
multinational companies, resulting in the erosion of tax bases (D’Ascenzo, 2013).  
 
The discussion of the concepts outlined in this chapter reflects that the background 
of tax competition is very similar to that of base erosion and profit shifting. 
Furthermore, it is evident that the effects of harmful tax practices are comparable to 
the effects of base erosion and profit shifting. It is clear that the above concepts are 
inter-linked and issues such as harmful tax competition and harmful tax practices 
have played a role in contributing to base erosion and profit shifting.  
 
This chapter aimed to build a sufficient understanding of the concepts discussed, in 
order to establish a background against which the strategies employed by 
multinational corporations can be examined.   The chapter that follows explores the 
current provisions of South African income tax legislation, which govern the 
treatment of international tax issues. This is considered important as – together with 
the concepts discussed in this chapter – it forms the foundation for considering the 
base erosion and profit shifting schemes employed by multinational corporations. 
This foundation is central to identifying the weaknesses of existing legislation, which 
is the main goal of this research. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE PROVISIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN INCOME TAX ACT 
RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL TAX 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Income Tax Act contains a number of provisions which address the treatment of 
international transactions. This chapter discusses a number of definitions and 
sections which are considered relevant in the context of base erosion and profit 
shifting by multinational corporations. Concepts such as source, residence, 
controlled foreign companies, permanent establishment, place of effective 
management and transfer pricing, with reference to case law where necessary, are 
discussed. Double tax agreements are also discussed in this chapter.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to create an understanding of the current income tax 
legislation, which is important in addressing the main goal of this research, as it is 
necessary to understand the provisions in order to identify gaps and shortfalls in 
current tax legislation, as well as to recognise the ways in which they are exploited 
by multinational companies. 
 
This chapter therefore addresses the second goal of the research: to review the 
provisions enacted within South African tax legislation which address international 
tax consequences. 
 
3.2. BASIS OF TAXATION 
 
3.2.1. BACKGROUND 
 
According to De Koker & Brincker (2010: §1.2), income tax is fundamentally 
territorial, therefore, as a result of tax competition countries may attempt to increase 
revenue collections by extending their tax jurisdictions as far as possible. The taxing 
right of any country is dependent on its fiscal jurisdiction. In Kerguelen Sealing & 
Whaling Co Ltd v CIR, 1939 AD 487, 10 SATC 363, it was held that if the natural 
resources of a country or the activities of its inhabitants produce wealth, that country 
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is entitled to a share in that wealth no matter where the recipient of the wealth may 
live (Emslie, Davis, Hutton & Olivier, 2001: 129). 
 
With effect from 1 January 2001, South Africa changed its source based system of 
taxation to a residence based system. Under the residence basis of taxation, 
―residents‖ are subject to tax on worldwide income, irrespective of the source of such 
income. With respect to non-residents, only income from a source within the 
Republic is subject to taxation within South Africa. This is in accordance with the 
definition of gross income contained in section 1 of the Income Tax Act, which reads 
as follows:  
 
 ―gross income‖, in relation to any year or period of assessment, means— 
(i) in the case of any resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, 
received by or accrued to or in favour of such resident; or 
(ii) in the case of any person other than a resident, the total amount, in 
cash or otherwise, received by or accrued to or in favour of such 
person from a source within the Republic, 
during such year or period of assessment, excluding receipts or accruals of a 
capital nature, but including, without in any way limiting the scope of this 
definition, such amounts (whether of a capital nature or not) as are described 
hereunder... (own emphasis) 
 
As can be seen, the concepts of ―source‖ and ―residence‖ are important in the 
consideration of whether an amount is to be included in a taxpayer’s gross income. 
These concepts form the basis upon which income tax can be levied, and in relation 
to international tax issues, the above concepts are considered to be of significance. 
However, it is important to note that although the concepts discussed above are 
relevant in the determination of tax jurisdiction, the provisions of a double tax 
agreement may override the definitions contained in the tax legislation of contracting 
countries to such agreements, for the purpose of avoiding double taxation (De Koker 
et al., 2010: §12.7.3). Double tax agreements are briefly discussed later in this 
chapter. 
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3.2.2. “SOURCE” BASIS OF TAXATION 
 
The term ―source‖ has not been defined in the Income Tax Act, therefore it is 
necessary to refer to case law in order to determine the meaning and gain sufficient 
guidance on the application of this term. 
 
One of the leading cases that can be consulted on the concept of ―source‖ is CIR v 
Lever Bros & Unilever Ltd, 1946 AD 441, 14 SATC 1. In passing judgment in this 
case, Watermeyer CJ stated as follows: 
 
…the source of receipts, received as income, is not the quarter whence they 
come, but the originating cause of their being received as income and that 
this originating cause is the work which the taxpayer does to earn them, the 
quid pro quo which he gives in return for which he receives them. The work 
which he does may be a business which he carries on, or an enterprise which 
he undertakes, or an activity in which he engages and it may take the form of 
personal exertion, mental or physical, or it may take the form of employment 
of capital either by using it to earn income or by letting its use to someone 
else. Often the work is some combination of these… (own emphasis) 
(Williams, 2009: 20) 
 
It was further clarified by Watermeyer CJ that the source of particular amounts of 
income is a two-fold issue – first, to establish the ―originating cause‖ and secondly, to 
establish whether that originating cause is within the Republic (Williams, 2009: 19). 
 
Difficulties in determining source may arise where activities are performed in the 
Republic and in one or more other countries. In these cases, the income earned from 
these activities may need to be apportioned between the countries, depending on 
the facts surrounding the situation. Currently, there are no provisions in the Income 
Tax Act for apportionment or source. In the determination of the source of the 
income in such cases, consideration must be given to the dominant source of the 
income – therefore the source will lie in the country where the main activities have 
taken place (Stiglingh, Koekemoer, Schalkwyk, Wilcocks, Swardt and Jordaan, 2009: 
55).  
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In CIR v Black, 1957 (3) SA 536(A), 21 SATC 226, it was stated that if the only true 
and reasonable conclusion of the facts found that the dominant or main or 
substantial or real and basic cause of the accrual of income was to be found in South 
Africa, then South Africa was the source of that income (Emslie et al., 2001: 131). 
 
In Essential Sterolin Products (Pty) Ltd v CIR, 1993(4) SA 859(A), 55 SATC 357, the 
judge made reference to the need to consider the factual matrix underlying and 
giving rise to the agreement in terms of which an amount becomes payable, in 
determining the originating cause of such amount. This principle was re-iterated in 
First National Bank of South Africa Ltd v C:SARS, 2002 64 SATC 245 (De Koker et 
al., 2010: §2.2). 
 
In considering the judgments in these cases, four general principles were identified 
in the determination of whether or not an amount was received from a source within 
the Republic. These principles are as follows: 
 
 determine the originating cause of the income and once this has been 
determined, establish the location thereof; 
 in seeking the above, regard must be given to the overall factual matrix of the 
circumstances; 
 against the factual matrix, the originating cause of a receipt may be found to 
occur in different countries, in which case the dominant or main cause of the 
accrual on income must be determined; and 
 it should always be borne in mind that the determination of the actual source 
of income is a difficult matter where it may be necessary to adopt a common 
sense approach. 
(De Koker et al., 2010: §2.2)  
 
Section 9 of the Income Tax Act contains a number of provisions in relation to 
specific categories of income, such as royalties and interest, establishing that these 
types of income have been received or accrued from a South African source. There 
are a number of other provisions in the Income Tax Act in relation to source, such as 
paragraph (n) of the ―gross income‖ definition and section 8E. However, these 
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provisions are considered to be beyond the scope of this research as, for the 
purposes of base erosion and profit shifting, the concept of ―source‖ need only be 
considered in relation to income which is not covered by a specific provision, as it is 
submitted that this creates a potential gap in the income tax legislation. 
 
It is important to note that the absence of a formal definition of ―source‖ can be seen 
as an area open to exploitation, particularly in relation to entities conducting business 
in the global environment. This is discussed further in later chapters of this thesis. 
 
3.2.3. “RESIDENCE” BASIS OF TAXATION 
 
The term ―resident‖ has been defined in section 1 of the Income Tax Act. In relation 
to a person other than a natural person (in other words, legal entities such as 
companies), paragraph (b) of the definition of ―resident‖ in section 1 states the 
meaning as: 
 
[a] person (other than a natural person) which is incorporated, established 
or formed in the Republic or which has its place of effective management 
in the Republic. (own emphasis) 
 
It is important to note that the definition further provides that the above ―does not 
include any person who is deemed to be exclusively a resident of another country for 
purposes of the application of any agreement entered into between the governments 
of the Republic and that other country for the avoidance of double taxation.‖ 
 
The definition clearly has two components, either of which will classify an entity as a 
resident – it is therefore necessary to discuss each of these components in more 
detail. 
 
3.2.3.1. INCORPORATED, ESTABLISHED OR FORMED 
 
The Income Tax Act does not contain a definition of ―incorporated, established or 
formed‖. However, in relation to a company, this component makes reference to the 
country in which the entity has been incorporated for legal purposes. Generally, 
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these factors can be determined through the inspection of the legal documents 
governing the company (De Koker et al., 2010: §17.3.1). 
 
It is submitted that the above component of the definition is not complex and has not 
been an area of confusion in the application of the definition; therefore further 
discussion is not necessary in the context of the research being undertaken. 
 
3.2.3.2. PLACE OF EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT 
 
The term ―place of effective management‖ has also not been defined in the Income 
Tax Act. However, some guidance is provided in SARS Income Tax Interpretation 
Note No. 6 ―Resident: Place of Effective Management (persons other than natural 
persons)‖ dated 26 March 2002 (hereinafter referred to as Interpretation Note 6). 
Interpretation Note 6 (SARS, 2002: 2) states that in order to determine the intended 
meaning of these words, the ordinary meaning, together with international precedent 
and interpretation should be considered.  
 
Interpretation Note 6 (SARS, 2002: 3) further lists three important considerations in 
the determination of the place of effective management as follows: 
 
 the place where central management and control is carried out by a board of 
directors; 
 the place where executive directors or senior management execute and 
implement the policy and strategic decisions made by the board of directors 
and make and implement day-to-day/regular/operational management and 
business activities; and 
 the place where the day-to-day business activities are carried out/conducted.  
 
According to Interpretation Note 6 (SARS, 2002: 4), it is recognised that no definitive 
rules can be laid down in determining the place of effective management, and that all 
relevant facts and circumstances should be considered. The following are listed as 
examples of facts that warrant due consideration: 
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 where the centre of top level management is located;  
 location of and functions performed at the headquarters;  
 where the business operations are actually conducted;  
 where controlling shareholders make key management and commercial 
decisions in relation to the company;  
 legal factors such as the place of incorporation, formation or establishment, 
the location of the registered office and public officer:  
 where the directors or senior managers or the designated manager, who are 
responsible for the day-to-day management, reside;  
 the frequency of the meetings of the entity’s directors or senior managers and 
where they take place;  
 the experience and skills of the directors, managers, trustees or designated 
managers who purport to manage the entity;  
 the actual activities and physical location of senior employees;  
 the scale of onshore as opposed to offshore operations; and 
 the nature of powers conferred upon representatives of the entity, the manner 
in which [those] powers are exercised by the representatives and the purpose 
of conferring the powers to the representatives.  
(SARS, 2002: 4-5) 
 
Interpretation Note 6 (SARS, 2002: 5) further clarifies that the list is not intended to 
be exhaustive or specific, but serves as a guideline.  
 
The OECD identifies the place of effective management as the ―place where the key 
management and commercial decisions that are necessary for the conduct of the 
entity’s business as a whole are in substance made‖ (OECD, 2012b: 8). This is 
ordinarily where the most senior person or body of persons (such as the board of 
directors) makes its decisions (Haupt, 2014: 30). 
 
It is clear that the view taken by the SARS in Interpretation Note 6 (2002) is much 
wider than the international view on this matter. Until recently, there has been no 
South African case law which provided clarity on the term ―place of effective 
management‖. In Oceanic Trust Co. Ltd. NO v C: SARS, 74 SATC 127, the judge 
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applied the principles laid down in Commissioner for Her Majesty's Revenue and 
Customs v Smallwood and Anor [2010] EWCA Civ 778, in considering the meaning 
of the term. These principles are as follows: 
 
 The place of effective management is the place where key management and 
commercial decisions that are necessary for the conduct of the entity's 
business are in substance made. 
 The place of effective management is ordinarily the place where the most 
senior group of persons (e.g. – but not necessarily – a board of directors) 
makes its decision, where the actions to be taken by the entity as a whole are 
determined. 
 No definitive rule can be given and all relevant facts and circumstances must 
be examined to determine the place of effective management of an entity. 
 There may be more than one place of management, but only one place of 
effective management at any one time. 
(Integritax, 2011: Online) 
 
Although the judge in the Oceanic Trust Co. Ltd case did not conclude on whether 
the trust had its place of effective management in South Africa, the principles 
referred to above are likely to be applied in other cases relating to the place of 
effective management. The principles applied in the Oceanic Trust Co. Ltd case 
confirm the OECD guidelines on establishing the place of effective management. It is 
submitted that this can be seen as an indication that the guidelines listed in 
Interpretation Note 6 (SARS, 2002) may not be applied in their entirety in certain 
cases. Furthermore, SIR v Downing (1975) 37 SATC 249 confirmed that South 
Africa is bound to take cognisance of the content of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital (hereinafter referred to as the OECD Model 
Tax Convention) when interpreting a double tax agreement (De Koker et al., 2010: 
§17.3.2). 
 
SARS (2011: Online) has also issued a discussion paper on Interpretation Note 6, 
listing a number of criticisms of the current guidelines set out in the Interpretation 
Note, and suggesting proposed changes. This is further indicative that the current 
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Interpretation Note no longer provides relevant guidance on the issue of place of 
effective management. It is submitted that the lack of clarity as well as the lack of 
South African case law dealing with the place of effective management may lead to 
an increased risk of exploitation of this obvious gap in tax legislation. 
 
3.3. CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANIES 
 
3.3.1. BACKGROUND 
 
Controlled foreign company rules were first introduced into the Income Tax Act in 
1997. However, when South Africa moved from a source basis of taxation to a 
residence basis, the scope of these rules widened considerably (De Koker et al., 
2010: §3.1). The rules in relation to controlled foreign companies are governed by 
section 9D of the Income Tax Act, which is an anti-avoidance provision aimed at 
South African residents who conduct income-earning activities through a foreign 
company. The purpose of this section is to ensure that passive income and 
―diversionary income‖ earned offshore is taxed in the Republic (Haupt, 2014: 609).  
 
According to Haupt (2014: 609), the term ―diversionary income‖ refers to income 
which the SARS considers to arise from suspect transactions between a controlled 
foreign company and a South African resident. Such transactions are considered to 
create opportunities for transfer pricing and therefore, increase the occurrence of tax 
avoidance. The purpose of section 9D of the Income Tax Act is therefore to tax, in 
the hands of a South African shareholder, an amount equivalent to that 
shareholder’s effective share of net income in a controlled foreign company, on an 
accrual basis. 
 
3.3.2. DEFINITIONS 
 
The following definitions are considered important in relation to the provisions of 
section 9D(1), in the context of base erosion and profit shifting: 
 
“controlled foreign company” means any foreign company where more 
than 50 per cent of the total participation rights in that foreign company are 
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directly or indirectly held, or more than 50 per cent of the voting rights in that 
foreign company are directly or indirectly exercisable, by one or more persons 
that are residents other than persons that are headquarter companies: 
Provided that— 
(a) no regard must be had to any voting rights in any foreign company— 
(i) which is a listed company; or 
(ii) if the voting rights in that foreign company are exercisable 
indirectly through a listed company; 
(b) any voting rights in a foreign company which can be exercised directly 
by any other controlled foreign company in which that resident 
(together with any connected person in relation to that resident) can 
directly or indirectly exercise more than 50 per cent of the voting rights 
are deemed for purposes of this definition to be exercisable directly by 
that resident; and 
(c) a person is deemed not to be a resident for purposes of determining 
whether residents directly or indirectly hold more than 50 per cent of 
the participation rights or voting rights in a foreign company, if— 
(i) in the case of a listed company or a foreign company the 
participation rights of which are held by that person indirectly 
through a listed company, that person holds less than five per 
cent of the participation rights of that listed company; or 
(ii) in the case of a scheme or arrangement contemplated in 
paragraph (e) (ii) of the definition of ―company‖ in section 1 or a 
foreign company the participation rights of which are held and 
the voting rights of which may be exercised by that person 
indirectly through such a scheme or arrangement, that person— 
(aa) holds less than five per cent of the participation rights of 
that scheme or arrangement; and 
(bb) may not exercise at least five per cent of the voting rights 
in that scheme or arrangement, 
unless more than 50 per cent of the participation rights or voting rights 
of that foreign company or other foreign company are held by persons 
who are connected persons in relation to each other. 
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“country of residence”, in relation to a foreign company, means the country 
where that company has its place of effective management.  
 
“foreign business establishment”, in relation to a controlled foreign 
company, means— 
(a) a fixed place of business located in a country other than the Republic 
that is used or will continue to be used for the carrying on of the 
business of that controlled foreign company for a period of not less 
than one year, where— 
(i) that business is conducted through one or more offices, shops, 
factories, warehouses or other structures; 
(ii) that fixed place of business is suitably staffed with on-site 
managerial and operational employees of that controlled foreign 
company who conduct the primary operations of that business; 
(iii) that fixed place of business is suitably equipped for conducting 
the primary operations of that business; 
(iv) that fixed place of business has suitable facilities for conducting 
the primary operations of that business; and 
(v) that fixed place of business is located outside the Republic 
solely or mainly for a purpose other than the postponement or 
reduction of any tax imposed by any sphere of government in 
the Republic: 
Provided that for the purposes of determining whether there is a fixed 
place of business as contemplated in this definition, a controlled foreign 
company may take into account the utilisation of structures as 
contemplated in subparagraph (i), employees as contemplated in 
subparagraph (ii), equipment as contemplated in subparagraph (iii), 
and facilities as contemplated in subparagraph (iv) of any other 
company— 
 (aa) if that other company is subject to tax in the country in which the 
fixed place of business of the controlled foreign company is 
located by virtue of residence, place of effective management or 
other criteria of a similar nature; 
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 (bb) if that other company forms part of the same group of 
companies as the controlled foreign company; and 
 (cc) to the extent that the structures, employees, equipment and 
facilities are located in the same country as the fixed place of 
business of the controlled foreign company; 
(b) any place outside the Republic where prospecting or exploration 
operations for natural resources are carried on, or any place outside 
the Republic where mining or production operations of natural 
resources are carried on, where that controlled foreign company 
carries on those prospecting, exploration, mining or production 
operations; 
(c) a site outside the Republic for the construction or installation of 
buildings, bridges, roads, pipelines, heavy machinery or other projects 
of a comparable magnitude which lasts for a period of not less than six 
months, where that controlled foreign company carries on those 
construction or installation activities; 
(d) agricultural land in any country other than the Republic used for bona 
fide farming activities directly carried on by that controlled foreign 
company; 
(e) a vessel, vehicle, rolling stock or aircraft used for purposes of 
transportation or fishing, or prospecting or exploration for natural 
resources, or mining or production of natural resources, where that 
vessel, vehicle, rolling stock or aircraft is used solely outside the 
Republic for such purposes and is operated directly by that controlled 
foreign company or by any other company that has the same country of 
residence as that controlled foreign company and that forms part of the 
same group of companies as that controlled foreign company; 
(f) a South African ship as defined in section 12Q engaged in international 
shipping as defined in that section; or 
(g) a ship engaged in international traffic used mainly outside the Republic. 
 “participation rights” in relation to a foreign company means— 
(a) the right to participate in all or part of the benefits of the rights (other 
than voting rights) attaching to a share, or any interest of a similar 
nature, in that company; or 
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(b) in the case where no person has any right in that foreign company as 
contemplated in paragraph (a) or no such rights can be determined for 
any person, the right to exercise any voting rights in that company. 
 
3.3.3. OVERVIEW OF CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY RULES 
 
Section 9D(2) of the Income Tax Act provides that an amount equal to the net 
income of the controlled foreign company shall be included in the income of a South 
African resident, in the proportion of such resident’s participation rights to the total 
participation rights in the company. Section 9D(2A) of the Income Tax Act further 
defines the net income of a controlled foreign company, which is determined as if 
that company was a South African resident, subject to certain provisos. In other 
words, the net income of the controlled foreign company is imputed and taxed in the 
hands of the South African resident. 
 
Certain provisos are contained in section 9D(2), in terms of which no obligation to 
impute part of the net income arises. These provisos can be summarised as follows: 
 
 Section 9D(2) will not apply to the extent that a resident, together with any 
connected person in relation to that resident, holds less than ten per cent of 
the participation rights and voting rights in the controlled foreign company. 
 Section 9D(2) will further not apply to the extent that the participation rights 
are held by a resident indirectly through another resident company – this 
proviso avoids the imputation of income at multiple shareholder levels. 
 Section 9D(2) will not apply to the extent that the participation rights are held 
by a South African registered long-term insurance company in any 
policyholder fund, provided this is not done for tax avoidance purposes. 
(De Koker et al., 2010: §3.4.4) 
 
A further proviso is contained in section 9D(2A) which states that the net income of a 
controlled foreign company will be nil if the amount of foreign tax is at least seventy-
five per cent of the amount of normal tax that would have been payable in respect of 
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the taxable income of the controlled foreign company, had that company been a 
resident for the applicable foreign tax year (Haupt, 2014: 619). 
 
Section 9D(9) of the Income Tax Act further provides that certain amounts must not 
be taken into account in determining the net income of a controlled foreign company. 
According to subparagraph (b) of this section, amounts attributable to a ―foreign 
business establishment‖ (as defined) must not be imputed to a South African 
resident, subject to certain exclusions (De Koker et al., 2010: §3.6.1). It is submitted 
that this is a provision that could be subject to abuse, as taxpayers could utilise 
foreign business establishments in order to avoid being taxed in South Africa. De 
Koker et al. (2010: §3.6.1) submits that this is the exemption most frequently relied 
on to avoid the imputation of the income from controlled foreign companies. This is 
discussed further in Chapter Four. 
 
3.4. TRANSFER PRICING AND THIN CAPITALISATION 
 
3.4.1. BACKGROUND 
 
The rapid growth in globalisation has resulted in an increase in international trade. 
An important provision in tax legislation that governs international transactions is 
transfer pricing, which refers to the price at which goods, services or intellectual 
property are transferred between related parties across international borders. Such 
transactions are typically entered into in order to shift profits from a high tax 
jurisdiction to a low or no tax jurisdiction. Transfer pricing is therefore a strategy 
frequently employed by multinational companies to reduce their tax burden. 
Transactions between related parties are commonly not entered into on an arm’s-
length basis, and this gives rise to the need for provisions within the Income Tax Act 
to address this issue. Most tax jurisdictions have based their transfer pricing 
provisions on the guidelines provided by the OECD (De Koker et al., 2010: §10.1). 
 
Thin capitalisation arises when a South African taxpayer is funded either directly or 
indirectly by connected non-resident persons. Excessive debt granted by non-
resident connected persons may result in excessive interest deductions, thereby 
32 
 
compromising the South African tax base. Generally, a taxpayer that has too little 
equity when compared to its debt, is said to be thinly capitalised (Haupt, 2014: 598). 
 
Section 31 of the Income Tax Act was introduced in 1995 to counter transfer pricing 
and thin capitalisation practices. There have been a number of legislative 
amendments to this section of the Income Tax Act since 1 April 2012, applicable to 
all years of assessment commencing on or after this date. The stated objective of 
such amendments was to modernise transfer pricing and thin capitalisation rules in 
order to align these rules with the OECD and international principles of taxation 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012: Online). The amended legislation is discussed in 
further detail below. 
 
3.4.2. DEFINITIONS 
 
The following definitions are relevant in relation to section 31: 
 
“affected transaction” means any transaction, operation, scheme, 
agreement or understanding  where –  
(a) that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding has 
been directly or indirectly entered into or effected between or for the 
benefit of either or both- 
(i) (aa) a person that is a resident; and 
   (bb) any other person that is not a resident; 
(ii) (aa) a person that is not a resident; and 
   (bb) any other person that is not a resident that has a 
permanent establishment in the Republic to which the 
transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or 
understanding relates; 
(iii) (aa) a person that is a resident; and 
   (bb) any other person that is a resident that has a permanent 
establishment outside the Republic to which the 
transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or 
understanding relates; or 
(iv) (aa) a person that is not a resident; and 
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   (bb) any other person that is a controlled foreign company in 
relation to any resident, 
and those persons are connected persons in relation to one another; 
and 
(b) any term or condition of that transaction, operation, scheme, 
agreement or understanding is different from any term or condition that 
would have existed had those persons been dealing at arm’s length. 
 
 “financial assistance” includes any- 
(a) debt; or 
(b) security or guarantee. 
 
“connected person” means a connected person as defined in section 1: 
Provided that the expression ―and no holder of shares holds the majority 
voting rights in the company‖ in paragraph (d) (v) of that definition must be 
disregarded. 
 
In this regard, section 1 of the Income Tax Act defines the term “connected 
person” in relation to a company as follows: 
 
(i) any other company that would be part of the same group of companies 
as that company if the expression ―at least 70 per cent of the equity 
shares in‖ in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of ―group of 
companies‖ in this section were replaced by the expression ―more than 
50 per cent of the equity shares or voting rights in‖; 
(ii) deleted; 
(iii) deleted; 
(iv) any person, other than a company as defined in section 1 of the 
Companies Act that individually or jointly with any connected person in 
relation to that person, holds, directly or indirectly, at least 20 per cent 
of— 
(aa) the equity shares in the company; or 
(bb) the voting rights in the company; 
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(v) any other company if at least 20 per cent of the equity shares or voting 
rights in the company are held by that other company, and no holder of 
shares holds the majority voting rights in the company; 
(vA) any other company if such other company is managed or controlled 
by— 
(aa) any person who or which is a connected person in relation to 
such company; or 
(bb) any person who or which is a connected person in relation to a 
person contemplated in item (aa); and 
(vi) .... 
 
The term “group of companies” as referred to in the definition of connected 
persons, is also of importance and section 1 sets out the definition as follows: 
 
...two or more companies in which one company (hereinafter referred to as 
the “controlling group company”) directly or indirectly holds shares in at 
least one other company (hereinafter referred to as the “controlled group 
company”), to the extent that— 
(a) at least 70 per cent of the equity shares in each controlled group 
company are directly held by the controlling group company, one or 
more other controlled group companies or any combination thereof; 
and 
(b) the controlling group company directly holds at least 70 per cent of 
the equity shares in at least one controlled group company. 
 
3.4.3. OVERVIEW OF TRANSFER PRICING AND THIN CAPITALISATION RULES 
 
As stated above, transfer pricing makes reference to the pricing of goods or services 
outside normal commercial parameters, the result of which is some tax advantage. 
Therefore, section 31(2) gives the Commissioner for the SARS discretionary powers 
to adjust artificial prices in order to reflect an arm’s length price (Stiglingh et al., 
2010: 583). The arm’s length price is determined by reference to the price that the 
goods or services in question would have been had the transaction been concluded 
between independent, unrelated persons. 
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The amendments to this section as referred to previously have had the following 
effects: 
 
 direct and indirect transactions may be scrutinised by the SARS; 
 transfer pricing now focuses not only on the supply of goods or services, but 
also on any cross-border ―transaction, scheme, agreement or understanding‖ 
whereby one or both parties gain a tax benefit; 
 the SARS may now determine compliance with the principle of arm’s length, 
with reference to either profit or pricing; 
 a greater burden of proof is placed on the taxpayer to demonstrate 
compliance with the arm’s length principle; 
 a secondary adjustment mechanism has also been introduced, in terms of 
which the primary transfer pricing adjustment as determined, will now be 
deemed to be an interest-free loan, which may lead to the imputation of 
interest; and 
 thin capitalisation rules are no longer separately addressed in the legislation 
as section 31(3) has been deleted – these rules are now incorporated into 
transfer pricing rules with the effect that the principle of arm’s length must be 
applied to financial assistance as well. 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012: Online) 
 
The amendment in respect of thin capitalisation, in particular, is of significance and 
currently no finalised guidelines have been provided by the SARS, who have (to 
date) issued only a draft Interpretation Note ―Determination of the taxable income of 
certain persons from international transactions: Thin Capitalisation‖ (hereinafter 
referred to as draft Interpretation Note) in 2013 in this regard. According to the draft 
Interpretation Note (SARS, 2013a: 11), a taxpayer is considered to be thinly 
capitalised if (amongst other factors), some or all of the following circumstances are 
applicable: 
 
 The taxpayer is carrying a greater quantity of interest-bearing debt than it 
could sustain on its own. 
 The duration of the loan is greater than what it would be at arm’s length. 
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 The repayment or other terms are not what would normally be entered into at 
arm’s length. 
 
As this Interpretation Note (SARS, 2013a) is subject to change, the draft guidelines 
are not discussed further. The deletion of section 31(3) has further resulted in SARS 
Practice Note 2 ―Income Tax: Determination of taxable income where financial 
assistance has been granted by a non-resident of the Republic to a resident of the 
Republic‖ dated 14 May 1996 (hereinafter referred to as Practice Note 2) no longer 
finding application in respect of thin capitalisation. SARS Practice Note 7 ―Section 31 
of the Income Tax Act, 1962: Determination of the taxable income of certain persons 
from international transactions: Transfer Pricing‖ dated 6 August 1999 (hereinafter 
referred to as Practice Note 7), previously provided guidance on the application of 
transfer pricing legislation in terms of section 31. However, due to the significant 
changes to legislation, it is submitted that the guidelines outlined in Practice Note 7 
(SARS, 1999) are to a large extent, no longer applicable and accordingly, are not 
discussed further.  
 
However, it is important to note that in relation to thin capitalisation, Practice Note 2 
(SARS, 1996) previously provided companies with a safe harbour, as the provisions 
of section 31(3) were not applied where the financial assistance to fixed capital ratio 
did not exceed three to one. Practice Note 2 (SARS, 1996) therefore previously 
determined the excessive portion of financial assistance to be the portion that 
exceeded an amount equal to three times the fixed capital of the resident or recipient 
of the financial assistance (De Koker et al., 2010: §10.14). This provided taxpayers 
with an assurance that if the financial assistance to fixed capital ratio was maintained 
at three to one, the SARS would not seek to apply the provisions of section 31(3). 
This safe harbour is no longer available to taxpayers and the amendments to section 
31 mean that the general arm’s length provisions will be used to determine whether 
a company is considered to be thinly capitalised (Haupt, 2014: 597). 
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Section 31(5) of the Income Tax Act provides that section 31 does not apply in the 
following instances: 
 
 where a non-resident grants financial assistance to a headquarter company, 
to the extent that such financial assistance is directly applied as financial 
assistance to any foreign company in which the headquarter company holds 
at least ten per cent of the equity shares and voting rights, either directly or 
indirectly; 
 if financial assistance is granted by a headquarter company to a foreign 
company in which it holds ten per cent or more of the equity shares and voting 
rights, either directly or indirectly, either alone or together with other 
companies which form part of the same group of companies of that 
headquarter company; 
 where a non-resident grants the use of intellectual property to the headquarter 
company, section 31 will not apply to the royalty paid by the headquarter 
company, to the extent that the headquarter company gives the use of such 
intellectual property to a foreign company in which the headquarter company 
holds at least ten per cent of the equity shares and voting rights, either directly 
or indirectly (either alone or together with other companies which form part of 
the same group of companies of that headquarter company) and the 
headquarter company does not use the intellectual property for any other 
purpose; and 
 the royalty paid by the foreign company (referred to above) to the headquarter 
company is also not subject to the provisions of section 31. 
(Haupt, 2014: 600) 
 
For years of assessment commencing on or after 1 January 2013, section 31(6) 
provides that section 31 will not apply in relation to the provision of financial 
assistance by a resident to a controlled foreign company if: 
 
 the resident (alone or together with any other company forming part of the 
same group of companies as that resident) owns at least ten per cent of the 
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equity shares and voting rights in that controlled foreign company (however, 
this exemption has been deleted with effect from 1 April 2014); 
 the controlled foreign company has a foreign business establishment as 
defined in section 9D (1); and 
 the aggregate amount of tax payable to all spheres of government of any 
country other than the Republic by that controlled foreign company in respect 
of any foreign tax year of that controlled foreign company during which that 
transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding exists is at least 
seventy-five per cent of the amount of normal tax that would have been 
payable in respect of any taxable income of that controlled foreign company 
had that controlled foreign company been a resident for that foreign tax year. 
(Haupt, 2014: 600) 
 
3.5. DOUBLE TAX AGREEMENTS 
 
3.5.1. BACKGROUND 
 
The change from a source basis of taxation to a residence basis, as well as the 
increase in cross-border transactions, gave rise to the problem of international 
double taxation. According to Haupt (2014: 631), the definition of international double 
taxation is generally the imposition of comparable taxes in two or more tax 
jurisdictions, on the same taxpayer, in respect of the same income.  
 
Double tax in two countries may arise in the following circumstances Haupt (2014: 
632): 
 
 if one country levies tax on a source basis while the second country levies tax 
on a residence basis, and the source of income is in one country while the 
recipient of the income is a resident in the other country; 
 if both countries levy tax on a residence basis but have different definitions of 
residence, as a result of which one person is considered to be resident in both 
countries; 
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 if both countries levy tax on a source basis but have different definitions of 
source; or 
 if both countries tax on a residence basis for residents and a source basis for 
non-residents – Haupt (2014) submits that this is one of the most common 
causes of double taxation. 
 
In order to address the problem of double taxation, double tax agreements were 
entered into between countries. According to Haupt (2014: 632), the main purpose of 
a double tax agreement is to resolve conflicts arising from source and residence; to 
determine the taxing rights between countries; and to set maximum levels of tax in 
situations where double tax is permitted. The provisions which authorise the 
conclusion of double tax agreements are found in section 108 of the Income Tax Act, 
which refers to the ―prevention, mitigation or discontinuance of the levying, under the 
laws of the Republic and of such other country, of tax in respect of the same income, 
profits or gains, or tax imposed in respect of the same donation, or to the rendering 
of reciprocal assistance in the administration of and the collection of taxes under the 
said laws of the Republic and of such other country‖. 
 
According to De Koker et al. (2010: §13.1), there are several issues which have not 
been addressed in double tax agreements concluded with a number of countries. 
This presents a greater risk when such agreements are with tax haven countries or 
countries with more favourable tax legislation. De Koker et al. (2010: §13.1) further 
submit that the double tax agreements of South Africa are old and contain a number 
of omissions and anomalies which could result in a loss to the South African fiscus. 
The following issues are considered to be part of the weaknesses of South Africa’s 
current double tax agreements: 
 
 Intricate financial arrangements – the definition of interest contained in South 
Africa’s double tax agreements is not as wide as the definition contained in 
section 24J of the Income Tax Act. Furthermore, there are financial 
instruments which have not been covered by double tax agreements, as a 
result of which associated profits are either dealt with as business profits or 
other income. Therefore, as a source state, South Africa may not be able to 
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levy taxes on such income to the extent that the income is not linked to a 
permanent establishment in the Republic. 
 Electronic commerce (hereinafter referred to as e-commerce) – many of 
South Africa’s double tax agreements do not make reference to e-commerce, 
which is considered a significant omission considering the growth in the digital 
economy over the years. This can result in the failure to consider whether an 
entity is considered to have a permanent establishment in a country, thereby 
allowing for such entities to escape taxation in that country. 
(De Koker et al., 2010: §13.1) 
 
It is submitted that a number of South Africa’s double tax agreements, like the 
Income Tax Act, have failed to keep up with the pace of globalisation. It is further 
submitted that many double tax agreements have not kept pace with changes to the 
Income Tax legislation. However, certain agreements have recently been 
renegotiated. On 17 May 2013, South Africa and Mauritius signed a new double tax 
agreement. The original treaty, like many other double tax agreements, was signed 
at a time when South Africa had a source basis of taxation and no capital gains tax. 
The renegotiated agreement seeks to address the issues of dual residence for 
persons other than individuals, withholding taxes and capital gains (Bouwer: Online). 
This is indicative that the South African tax authorities are aware of the shortcomings 
of current agreements, and may seek to correct these weaknesses by renegotiating 
a number of other double tax agreements. 
 
In considering double tax agreements in the context of base erosion and profit 
shifting, it is necessary to consider the concepts of ―treaty shopping‖ and ―permanent 
establishment‖. 
 
3.5.2. TREATY SHOPPING 
 
Treaty shopping is defined as follows: 
 
The practice of structuring a multinational business to take advantage of more 
favourable tax treaties available in certain jurisdictions. A business that 
resides in a home country that doesn't have a tax treaty with the source 
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country from which it receives income can establish an operation in a second 
source country that does have a favourable tax treaty in order to minimize its 
tax liability with the home country...  
(BusinessDictionary: Online) 
 
The terms ―treaty shopping‖ and ―treaty abuse‖ may be used interchangeably and 
this problem has been identified by the OECD as being one of the most important 
sources of base erosion and profit shifting concerns (OECD, 2014a: 2). 
 
Treaty abuse can often lead to the instance of double non-taxation, which means 
that items of income may go untaxed in any tax jurisdiction. This is explored in 
further detail in Chapter Four of this thesis. It is submitted that this was not the 
intended effect of double tax agreements, and such occurrences indicate that gaps 
in treaty provisions may exist, which need to be addressed. 
 
3.5.3. PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
 
The term ―permanent establishment‖ has been defined in section 1 of the Income 
Tax Act as follows: 
 
...a permanent establishment as defined from time to time in Article 5 of the 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development... 
 
According to De Koker et al. (2010: §18.1), the purpose of this concept is to outline 
the scope of the activities which an enterprise of the residence state must conduct in 
the source state, before the profits arising from its activities may be subject to tax in 
the source state. 
 
The concept of permanent establishment is outlined in Article 5 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention, which is to be considered in conjunction with Article 7 which 
provides that the profits of an enterprise may not be subject to tax in the source state 
unless profits were derived through a permanent establishment situated in the 
source state. The OECD (2012c: 1) defines the term permanent establishment as ―a 
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fixed place of business, through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or 
partly carried on‖. Therefore, the following conditions are contained in the definition: 
 
 the existence of a place of business; 
 such place of business must be fixed (established at a distinct place with a 
certain degree of permanence); and 
 the business of the enterprise must be carried on through this fixed place of 
business. 
 
In relation to permanent establishment, the concept of ―carrying on of business‖ is 
important and is an issue that has been considered by the courts in the context of 
the Income Tax Act. In Estate G v COT (1964) 26 SATC 168, the following was 
stated: 
 
The sensible approach…is to look at the activities concerned as a whole, and 
then to ask the question:  Are these the sort of activities which, in commercial 
life, would be regarded as ―carrying on business‖? The principal features of 
the activities which might be examined in order to determine this are their 
nature, their scope and magnitude, their object (whether to make a profit or 
not), the continuity of the activities concerned, if the acquisition of property is 
involved, the intention with which the property was acquired. The list of 
features does not purport to be exhaustive, nor are any one of these features 
necessarily decisive, nor is it possible to generalize and state which feature 
should carry most weight in determining the problem. Each case must depend 
on its own particular circumstances. 
(De Koker et al., 2010: §18.2) 
 
According to the OECD, the business of an enterprise is carried on mainly by the 
entrepreneur or persons in a paid-employment relationship with the enterprise, 
including employees and other persons acting on instructions from the enterprise. 
Whether or not such person has the authority to conclude contracts on behalf of the 
enterprise is not relevant if the person works at a fixed place, representing the 
enterprise (OECD, 2012c: 8). 
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The OECD has provided further clarification in respect of permanent establishment 
in the context of e-commerce. In summary, an internet website, which is considered 
to be a combination of software and electronic data, does not constitute tangible 
property and therefore does not have a location that can be regarded as a ―place of 
business‖. However, the server on which the website is stored and through which it 
is accessible, is a piece of equipment which does have a physical location. Such 
location may be regarded as a ―fixed place of business‖ of the enterprise which 
operates the server (OECD, 2012c: 24). 
 
The OECD (2012c: 25-26) outlines other guidelines to be considered in determining 
whether a permanent establishment exists, including whether the server is located at 
a fixed place for a sufficient period, whether the business of the enterprise is wholly 
or partly carried on through the server, whether the equipment could function without 
the involvement of personnel or whether the activities performed via the server are of 
a preparatory or auxiliary nature (for example, advertising). 
 
3.6. CONCLUSION 
 
The concepts discussed in this chapter assisted in creating a basic understanding of 
the provisions of the Income Tax Act that govern international transactions. This is 
considered to be important as multinational corporations operate across international 
borders and accordingly, are governed by these provisions.  
 
It is evident from the definitions and discussions in this chapter, that terms such as 
―place of effective management‖, ―foreign business establishment‖ and ―permanent 
establishment‖ are common to a number of the provisions in the Income Tax Act 
which govern the treatment of international transactions.  
 
The legislative provisions discussed in this chapter are often complex and lengthy, 
and have only been discussed in as much detail as was considered necessary. 
Furthermore, any gaps that are evident in the current legislation have been pointed 
out and are expanded on in later chapters of this thesis. 
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As stated previously, this chapter, together with the preceding chapter aimed to 
provide a sufficient background understanding against which to consider the base 
erosion and profit shifting schemes employed by multinational corporations. The next 
chapter reviews the schemes employed by multinational companies to reduce their 
respective tax burdens – and the associated weaknesses that the schemes reveal in 
the provisions of the Income Tax Act that address international tax consequences.  
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CHAPTER 4:  TAX REDUCTION SCHEMES EMPLOYED BY MULTINATIONAL 
COMPANIES 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
According to the World Trade Organisation (Online), multinational corporations 
account for approximately seventy per cent of worldwide trade. This means that a 
significant amount of income that crosses international borders does so within the 
same multinational corporation. This highlights the extent to which income may be 
shifted in order to achieve overall tax benefits within the group. 
 
This chapter presents a limited review of schemes employed by multinational 
companies to reduce their respective tax burdens – and the associated weaknesses 
that such schemes reveal in the provisions of the Income Tax Act which govern 
international transactions. Where information is available, the estimated tax revenue 
that has been lost in certain jurisdictions due to these schemes is provided. Other 
strategies that can be used by multinational companies to shift profits are also 
discussed insofar as they are not included in the case studies conducted. The nature 
and operation of the schemes discussed are public knowledge, therefore no 
confidentiality considerations arise. 
 
This chapter therefore addresses the third goal of the research: to study the tax 
structures adopted by well-known multinational companies and where available, 
provide estimates of the losses in tax revenue suffered as a result of profit shifting 
schemes by these companies. Furthermore, the main goal of the research is also 
addressed: to determine the weaknesses within South Africa’s current tax legislation 
uncovered by the tax schemes used by multinational companies in order to shift 
profits.  
 
The multinational companies selected for further study are as follows:  
 Apple Inc.;  
 Google; 
 Starbucks; and  
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 SABMiller. 
 
Since many of the strategies used by these companies incorporate some of the 
characteristics of a scheme known as the ―double Irish arrangement‖ and the 
extension of this scheme, known as the ―Dutch sandwich‖, it is necessary to first 
explain the components of these schemes before considering how they are used in 
respect of the multinational companies selected for further study. 
 
4.2. THE “DOUBLE IRISH ARRANGEMENT” 
 
In the late 1980s, Apple Inc. was among the pioneers of a scheme known as the 
―double Irish arrangement‖, which is one of many tax avoidance strategies used by 
multinational corporations. This scheme uses payments between related entities in a 
corporate structure to shift income from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions.  
 
In order to clarify the details of this scheme, it is explained in the context of a 
multinational company’s tax avoidance in the United States of America (hereinafter 
referred to as the USA or the US). The scheme relies on the fact that Ireland’s tax 
laws do not include US transfer pricing rules. Irish tax legislation uses a ―territorial‖ 
basis, and therefore does not levy taxes on income of subsidiaries of Irish 
companies that are outside the state. Typically, this arrangement allows for a 
company to arrange that the rights to exploit intellectual property outside the US, are 
owned by an offshore company. This is normally achieved through a cost-sharing 
agreement between the parent company in the US and the offshore company, in 
terms of which the offshore company is able to receive all profits from the 
exploitation of the intellectual property rights outside the parent company’s resident 
country, without paying taxes on these profits in the US until they are remitted to the 
parent company (Darby & Lemaster, 2007: 13). 
 
The scheme is known as the ―double Irish arrangement‖ as it requires two Irish 
companies in order to complete the structure. In order for the scheme to achieve the 
purpose of tax avoidance, one of these companies needs to be a tax resident of a 
―tax haven‖, a concept which was discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis. Irish tax 
law provides that a company’s residency is established with reference to where its 
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central management and control is located, and not where such company is 
incorporated. This makes it possible for one of the two Irish companies in the 
arrangement not to be considered a tax resident of Ireland.  The company resident in 
the tax haven country owns the international rights over the intellectual property, 
which is then licensed to the second company (an Irish tax resident), in return for 
substantial royalties or other fees. The Irish-resident company receives income from 
the use of the asset in international countries, but taxable income is low due to the 
deductibility of the substantial royalty or fee paid to the company which is a resident 
of the tax haven. The remaining profits of the Irish resident are taxed at a rate of 
twelve and a half per cent, in accordance with Ireland’s corporate tax rate (Darby & 
Lemaster, 2007: 13).  
 
In order for the scheme to avoid taxes in the US, it is important to ensure that the 
offshore companies are not subject to the controlled foreign company regulations of 
the US tax legislation. This is achieved by ensuring that the second Irish company is 
a fully-owned subsidiary of the first Irish company which is resident in the tax haven 
country, and then making an entity classification election for the second company to 
be disregarded as a separate entity from its owner, as allowed by US tax legislation. 
This is commonly known in the US as the ―check-the-box‖ regime. The payments 
between the two Irish companies are therefore ignored for US tax purposes (Darby & 
Lemaster, 2007: 13). 
 
It is submitted that, for the purpose of this discussion (and the one that follows), the 
specific tax provisions in US and Irish legislation are not relevant as its purpose is 
simply to describe the nature of the scheme. 
 
4.3. THE “DUTCH SANDWICH” 
 
The ―Dutch sandwich‖ is an extension of the ―double Irish arrangement‖, and 
consists of the establishment of a company in the Netherlands, interposed between 
the two Irish companies. This scheme is commonly known as the ―double Irish with a 
Dutch sandwich‖. Under the ―double Irish arrangement‖, the second Irish company 
(resident in Ireland for tax purposes) would pay a royalty to the first company 
(resident in the tax haven country). Normally, this would result in withholding tax 
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being payable on the royalty. By introducing a Dutch conduit company through which 
the royalty is routed to the tax haven resident company, multinational corporations 
are able to avoid the withholding tax levy, as royalties paid from Ireland to the 
Netherlands are tax-free under the European Union Interest and Royalty Directive, 
and the Netherlands does not impose withholding tax on any royalty payments, 
regardless of the residence state of the company receiving the royalty (Fuest, 
Spengel, Finke, Heckemeyer & Nusser, 2013: 5).  
 
The Dutch company collects royalties from the second Irish company and the Irish 
company is able to claim a tax deduction for this payment, thereby further reducing 
its tax liability in Ireland. The Dutch company then pays the money to the first Irish 
company, which is a resident of a tax haven country and therefore not liable for tax in 
Ireland. Due to the introduction of the Dutch conduit company, withholding tax is 
completely avoided (Fuest et al., 2013: 5). The following is an illustration of the 
―double Irish with a Dutch sandwich‖ scheme: 
 
 
Source: IP finance, 2013: Online 
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Although pioneered by Apple Inc., the ―double Irish with a Dutch sandwich‖ is a 
strategy employed by various other multinational corporations such as Google 
(Haden, 2012: Online). Furthermore, a recent report published by the US Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has detailed a tax avoidance strategy 
used by Apple Inc. which reveals a simpler structure than that of the ―double Irish 
with a Dutch sandwich‖ (Ting, 2014: 40). This is discussed in further detail below. 
 
4.4. APPLE INCORPORATED 
 
4.4.1. BACKGROUND 
 
Apple Inc. is a multinational company, incorporated on 3 January 1977, which 
designs, manufactures and markets mobile devices, personal computers and music 
players and also sells related software, services, peripherals, networking solutions 
and third-party digital content and applications (Reuters: Online).  
 
Since 2012, Apple Inc. has been ranked as the largest publicly traded corporation in 
the world by market capitalisation, and has maintained this position as of 31 March 
2014 (Financial Times, 2014: Online). Apple Inc. is one of the many companies 
operating in the global business environment, and is one of the major providers of 
the ―digital product‖, which means that the company supplies products or services 
through the internet. This allows for the company to operate across various 
countries, without having a physical presence in these countries.  
 
4.4.2. SCHEMES USED BY APPLE INC. 
 
4.4.2.1. INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE OF APPLE INC. FOR TAX PURPOSES 
 
According to Ting (2014: 42), shortly before its listing on the New York Stock 
Exchange, Apple Inc. established three wholly-owned subsidiaries in Ireland – Apple 
Operations International (hereinafter referred to as AOI), Apple Operations Europe 
(hereinafter referred to as AOE) and Apple Sales International hereinafter referred to 
as ASI). The structure is outlined in the diagram below: 
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Source: Ting, 2014: 43 
 
AOI is incorporated in Ireland, but has its central management and control in the US. 
It is essentially a ―shell‖ company with no employees. In terms of Irish tax legislation, 
since the company is centrally managed and controlled outside Ireland, it is not 
regarded as a resident of Ireland. AOI is also not regarded as a resident of the US, 
as US tax law defines the residence of a company solely in terms of the place of 
incorporation (Ting, 2014: 44). 
 
ASI is also incorporated in Ireland but on the same basis as AOI, it is not regarded 
as a tax resident in either Ireland or the US. The company had no employees until 
2012, when 250 employees were assigned to it from its parent company, AOE. ASI 
engages with unrelated manufacturers in China to assemble products and sells the 
finished products to distribution subsidiaries in Europe and Asia. In most instances, 
the products do not physically transit through Ireland. ASI and the ultimate parent 
company, Apple Inc., are parties to a cost-sharing agreement, in terms of which ASI 
has the economic rights to Apple’s intellectual property outside the US, while the 
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legal ownership of the intellectual property always remains with Apple Inc. in the US 
(Ting, 2014: 44). In terms of the cost-sharing agreement, ASI is obliged to pay Apple 
Inc. a percentage of the group’s research and development costs, in proportion to 
the percentage of Apple’s worldwide sales outside the USA.  
 
Ting (2014: 45) submits that a review of the amounts of costs shared under the cost-
sharing agreement does not appear to make commercial sense, as ASI derived 
significant amounts of income, which were disproportionally high in comparison to 
the cost-sharing payments. This has effectively resulted in a large portion of profits 
remaining in ASI, which as stated previously, is not considered to be a tax resident in 
either Ireland or the US. 
 
According to Ting (2014: 45), Apple’s tax structure is in full compliance with the tax 
laws of the countries involved, but the location of the profits does not reflect the 
location of the economic activities, such as sales and research and development. 
Furthermore, the profits allocated to the Irish companies are not taxable in the US, 
and also not taxable in the source countries where the Apple products were sold. 
This reflects how Apple Inc. was able to achieve double non-taxation of a large 
proportion of its worldwide profits.  
 
4.4.3. ESTIMATED LOSS IN TAX REVENUE FROM APPLE INC 
 
According to the information supplied by Apple Inc. to the US Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, in 2011, tax amounting to $3.5 billion was avoided 
on foreign-based sales income of $10 billion, while in 2012 $9 billion of tax was 
avoided on $25 billion of foreign-based sales income. Therefore, over two years, 
Apple Inc. was able to avoid taxes amounting to $12.5 billion (Hickey, 2013: Online).  
 
4.5. GOOGLE 
 
4.5.1. BACKGROUND 
 
Google’s main office is located in the USA, in the state of California. The company 
was incorporated in California in September 1998, and re-incorporated in Delaware 
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in August 2003 (Google Inc., 2013: 3). Google’s revenue is earned mainly through 
advertising. People or companies contract with Google to have their advertisements 
shown to people who may be interested in the service or product offered. Google 
earns the advertising revenue only if the advertisement link is clicked on, therefore it 
is important that the advertisements are targeted at the correct audience. This is 
achieved through Google Analytics, which sends data to Google whenever a person 
visits a website. Based on this information, and other data at their disposal, Google 
creates a profile of a person, which provides an indication of which advertisements 
should be shown to that user (Google Inc., 2013: 4-5). 
 
According to Google’s consolidated income statement for the year ended 31 
December 2013, approximately ninety-one per cent of the company’s revenue was 
derived from advertising (Google Inc., 2013: 28).  
 
4.5.2. SCHEMES USED BY GOOGLE 
 
4.5.2.1. THE “DOUBLE IRISH WITH A DUTCH SANDWICH” 
 
The general outline of this scheme has been discussed. Therefore, the application of 
the scheme in relation to Google is discussed further: 
 
 Google licenses the rights to its intellectual property to a company called 
Google Irish Holdings, a company which is headquartered in Bermuda (a tax-
free state). 
 Google Irish Holdings owns a subsidiary called Google Ireland Limited, a 
company located in Dublin that sells advertising. 
 Google Ireland Limited earns billions in revenue and is subject to tax at a rate 
of twelve and a half per cent in accordance with Irish corporate tax legislation. 
However, most of these earnings are sent back (in the form of royalties) to 
Google Irish Holdings, which is not considered to be a resident in Ireland and 
therefore not liable for tax in this country, other than on income from a source 
within Ireland. 
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 Payments from Google Ireland Limited are routed through Google 
Netherlands Holdings, an Amsterdam-based company with no employees. 
Therefore, no withholding tax is levied by Ireland on the royalty payment to 
the Dutch company, due to the European Union Interest and Royalty 
Directive. Furthermore, the Netherlands does not impose withholding tax on 
any royalty payments. 
(Haden, 2012: Online) 
 
By making use of the scheme, Google is able to ensure that a significant portion of 
its profits are routed to low- or no-tax jurisdictions, and the company is able to 
reduce its tax burden significantly. 
 
4.5.3. ESTIMATED LOSS IN TAX REVENUE FROM GOOGLE 
 
According to Haden (2012: Online), by adopting the tax avoidance strategy 
discussed, Google is able to save approximately $1 billion in taxes every year. 
However, it is important to note that this is merely an estimate and, to date, no formal 
estimates have been released by any tax authorities.   
 
4.6. STARBUCKS 
 
4.6.1. BACKGROUND 
 
Starbucks is a global coffee company, based in Washington, USA and was 
incorporated in 1985. The first Starbucks opened in 1971 and since then the 
company has significantly expanded. As at 30 March 2014, the company operated a 
total of 20,519 stores across sixty-five countries (Starbucks, 2014: Online).   
 
It is evident that Starbucks has an expansive global presence. Currently, South 
Africa does not yet house a Starbucks store. However, in 2010, Southern Sun Hotel 
South Africa announced that an agreement has been signed with Starbucks, 
enabling them to brew Starbucks coffees in selected Southern Sun and Tsogo Sun 
Hotels and Casinos in South Africa (Tsogo Sun, 2010: Online). 
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Starbucks has recently been the subject of media criticism in the UK with respect to 
the company’s tax avoidance (Bergin, 2012: Online).  
 
4.6.2. SCHEMES USED BY STARBUCKS 
 
4.6.2.1. ROYALTIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
 
Similar to the schemes used by Apple Inc. and Google, Starbucks houses its 
intellectual property in a tax haven or low-tax jurisdiction, and charges companies 
within the group a royalty fee for use of the intellectual property. In the case of 
Starbucks, a royalty at a rate of six per cent is payable to the Amsterdam-based 
company, Starbucks Coffee EMEA BV (Bergin, 2012: Online). This enables the 
multinational corporation to shift its profits from higher-tax jurisdictions to the 
Netherlands, where it is alleged that a lower tax rate has been agreed with the Dutch 
government (UKUncut: Online). 
 
4.6.2.2. THE PROCUREMENT OF COFFEE BEANS FROM SWITZERLAND 
 
Starbucks allegedly buys coffee beans for the UK through a Switzerland-based 
company, Starbucks Coffee Trading Co. The beans are then roasted at a subsidiary 
based in Amsterdam. According to the Chief Financial Officer of Starbucks, the tax 
authorities in the Netherlands and Switzerland require Starbucks to allocate some 
profits from its UK sales to the Dutch roasting and Swiss procurement companies. 
The basis of this allocation is unknown (Bergin, 2012: Online). It is submitted that 
this arrangement allows Starbucks to further shift profits from the UK to lower tax 
jurisdictions, thereby reducing its tax burden in the UK. 
 
4.6.2.3. INTER-COMPANY LOANS 
 
According to Bergin (2012: Online), Starbucks UK is entirely funded by debt, on 
which the interest rates are seen to be significantly high. This enables the company 
to shift profits by claiming a deduction for interest in higher-tax jurisdictions. The 
allegation that Starbucks UK is entirely funded by debt is indicative that the company 
is considered to be ―thinly capitalised‖.  
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4.6.3. ESTIMATED LOSS IN TAX REVENUE FROM STARBUCKS 
 
To date, no formal quantification process has been undertaken to determine the 
estimated loss in tax revenue from Starbucks. 
 
4.7. SABMiller 
 
4.7.1. BACKGROUND 
 
SABMiller currently produces beers in over eighty countries. The company originated 
in Johannesburg, South Africa and was founded in 1895. Two years later, it became 
the first industrial company to list on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (hereinafter 
referred to as the JSE). In 1898, the company listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
From the early 1900s, the company began expanding globally and made several 
acquisitions in emerging and developed markets. In 1999, it formed a new holding 
company based in the UK, and moved its primary listing to London. In 2002, Miller 
Brewing was acquired, and SABMiller Plc. was formed (SABMiller: Online). 
 
4.7.2. SCHEMES USED BY SABMiller 
 
4.7.2.1. THE USE OF A DUTCH COMPANY AS THE TRADEMARK HOLDER 
 
According to a report published by ActionAid (2010: 8), SABMiller is able to avoid 
taxes through the utilisation of a company in the Netherlands. SABMiller International 
BV, a Rotterdam-based company, owns African brands such as Castle, Stone and 
Chibuku, and takes advantage of special tax rules offered by the Netherlands that 
enables companies to pay little or no taxes on royalties earned. In owning these 
brands, the company in the Netherlands earns substantial royalties from the 
companies in Africa, where these products are brewed and consumed. The latest 
Annual Report published by SABMiller Plc. (2014: 159) reflects SABMiller 
International BV’s principal activity as ―Trademark owner‖. Therefore it appears that 
the strategy identified by ActionAid is currently still being used by SABMiller.  
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In using the Dutch company in this manner, the companies in Africa are able to claim 
a substantial tax deduction for the royalties paid, while the royalties earned by the 
Dutch company are subject to little or no tax. Furthermore, ActionAid (2010: 23) 
submits that an additional motivation behind this scheme is that Dutch tax law allows 
for the cost of acquired trademarks to be amortised over a number of years. 
ActionAid (2010: 23) further concluded from its review, that in the 2009/2010 
financial year, a tax reduction of £12.6 million in respect of this amortisation was 
claimed against an income tax liability of £12.4 million in SABMiller International BV, 
resulting in no taxes being paid by the Dutch company except for withholding taxes 
of £2.7 million.  
 
4.7.2.2. SERVICE FEES PAID TO COMPANIES IN EUROPEAN “TAX 
HAVENS”  
 
According to the ActionAid (2010: 8), the second scheme used by SABMiller to 
reduce their tax burden, is for the company’s African and Indian subsidiaries to pay 
significant management service fees to companies in European ―tax havens‖ such as 
Switzerland. Using this strategy, SABMiller is able to reduce the taxable income of 
companies paying this fee by claiming a tax deduction in respect of the management 
service fee. By routing these fees to ―tax haven‖ countries, little or no taxes would be 
levied on the receipt of this income, thereby significantly reducing SABMiller’s overall 
tax burden. 
 
4.7.2.3. THE PROCUREMENT OF GOODS FROM MAURITIUS  
 
ActionAid (2010: 9) has identified that goods are procured by Accra Brewery Ltd (a 
brewing company in Ghana), from MUBEX, which is a Mauritian subsidiary of 
SABMiller Plc. MUBEX makes a profit on this transaction. Favourable tax rates in 
Mauritius (a maximum rate of three per cent for global business companies) 
therefore ensures that the profit made by MUBEX is taxed at a lower rate as 
compared to a higher tax jurisdiction, while the expense claimed as a deduction in 
Accra Brewery Ltd lowers its taxable income which would be subject to tax at a rate 
of twenty-five per cent in Ghana.  
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4.7.2.4. THIN CAPITALISATION 
 
ActionAid (2010: 9) has further identified that Accra Brewery Ltd has borrowed a 
substantial amount of money from the Mauritian incorporated MUBEX, and claims 
that the loan is more than seven times Accra Brewery Ltd’s capital. This means that 
Accra Brewery Ltd is considered to be ―thinly capitalised‖. The company is therefore 
able to claim a deduction of interest in respect of this loan. ActionAid (2010: 28) 
claims that the full interest cost appears to have been claimed by Accra Brewery Ltd, 
despite Ghanaian tax law which specifies a maximum debt-equity ratio, in terms of 
which any interest costs incurred above the maximum ratio may not be deducted 
from taxable profits. 
 
4.7.3. ESTIMATED LOSS IN TAX REVENUE FROM SABMiller 
 
ActionAid (2010: 8) estimates that developing countries have lost a total of 
approximately £20 million in 2010 due to the schemes employed by SABMiller to 
reduce its tax burden. However, it is submitted that this estimate is based on the 
information at the disposal of ActionAid, and may not be accurate. In estimating this 
figure, ActionAid reviewed the accounts of eight SABMiller subsidiary companies in 
Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, South Africa, Zambia and India.  
 
No quantification of the losses in tax revenue has been formally published by any of 
the revenue authorities in these countries. 
 
4.8. WEAKNESSES IN TAX LEGISLATION REVEALED BY THESE SCHEMES 
 
The schemes discussed exploit weaknesses in tax legislation. These weaknesses 
are discussed below and a comparison to the equivalent provisions in the Income 
Tax Act of South Africa is made in order to identify similar gaps or reveal other 
potential gaps in South African tax legislation. 
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4.8.1. ARBITRAGE BETWEEN CORPORATE RESIDENCE DEFINITIONS 
 
As discussed, Ireland’s definition of residence in relation to corporate entities is in 
terms of central management and control. The US definition of corporate tax 
residence is in terms of place of incorporation. A company incorporated in Ireland but 
centrally managed and controlled in the US, would therefore not be resident of either 
country. The Irish company would be liable for taxation in Ireland only on income 
sourced in the country, under the source basis of taxation. Any income sourced 
outside Ireland would not be subject to Irish taxes due to the non-residence of the 
company. It is evident that schemes such as the ―double Irish arrangement‖ exploit 
the differences in the definitions of corporate residence between the two countries, 
as well as the source basis of taxation. As a result, the benefit of double non-taxation 
is enjoyed by Apple Inc. on a large portion of its income (Ting, 2014: 46). The same 
applies to other multinational corporations using the same or similar schemes in 
order to shift profits. 
 
In comparing these aspects of US tax legislation with that of South Africa’s, it is 
evident that the South African definition of residence in relation to corporate entities 
is wider than that of the US, as the definition includes entities ―incorporated, 
established or formed‖ in South Africa, as well as those whose ―place of effective 
management‖ is in South Africa. However, as pointed out previously, the lack of 
formal definitions of the above terms, as well as the criticisms of Interpretation Note 
6 (SARS, 2002) indicates a potential gap which can be exploited by multinational 
companies.  
 
Furthermore, the lack of a formal definition of ―source‖ can also be seen to be a gap 
within income tax legislation. In order to prevent the non-taxation of non-resident 
multinational companies on income from sources within South Africa, it is submitted 
that the term should be clearly defined, especially in relation to the digital economy. 
In instances where a double tax treaty exists with the company’s resident country, 
the concept of ―permanent establishment‖ would be considered more important. This 
is discussed in further detail later in this chapter. 
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4.8.2. TRANSFER PRICING RULES ON INTANGIBLES 
 
According to Ting (2014: 47), a key component of Apple Inc.’s scheme is the transfer 
of the economic rights of the company’s intellectual property to ASI under the cost-
sharing agreement. As a result of the intra-group contract entered into, ASI owns the 
production and marketing rights of Apple Inc.’s products for Europe and Asia. 
Furthermore, ASI does not pay royalties to Apple Inc. due to the split economic 
ownership of the intangible assets. The cost-sharing regime was introduced in the 
US in the early 1990s, under which a US parent company may enter into an 
agreement with a foreign subsidiary to share the research and development costs of 
developing the intellectual property. Based on the percentage of cost-sharing agreed 
upon, the foreign subsidiary is entitled to a percentage of the profits earned from the 
intangible asset, even if the research and development activities take place wholly in 
the US.  
 
It is submitted that the use of these provisions in the US tax legislation by 
multinational corporations in order to shift profits and avoid taxes is indicative of the 
presence of a tax loophole.  
 
The OECD has recognised that the regulations on transfer pricing on intangibles is 
an area of weakness, and it has been identified as part of the OECD’s Action Plan 
on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013a: 20). This will be discussed in further 
detail in Chapter Five of this thesis.   
 
It is important to note that South African tax legislation currently contains an anti-
avoidance provision with respect to intellectual property in terms of section 23I of the 
Income Tax Act. The effect of section 23I is to prohibit the deduction of royalties paid 
in respect of intellectual property which was created in South Africa, then sold to a 
non-resident, and then licensed back to the South African company which created 
the intellectual property. Such an arrangement would render the intellectual property 
as ―tainted intellectual property‖, which a defined term. A classification as ―tainted 
intellectual property‖ would render any expenditure incurred for the use or right of 
use of or permission to use tainted intellectual property, non-deductible for tax 
purposes, to the extent that it does not constitute income to a South African resident 
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or does not constitute part of the imputed income of a controlled foreign company in 
terms of section 9D of the Income Tax Act (Integritax, 2012: Online). However, 
where such expenditure is subject to withholding tax of at least ten per cent in South 
Africa, allowances are made in terms of section 23I(3), which provides that one-third 
of such expenditure is allowed as a deduction if the withholding tax is payable at a 
rate of ten per cent, while one half of the expenditure is allowed as a deduction if 
withholding tax is payable at a rate of fifteen per cent. 
 
It is submitted that by introducing such an anti-avoidance provision, South Africa 
would be in a stronger position to prevent the shift of profits in respect of intellectual 
property, than countries which do not contain such provisions in tax legislation. 
However, cost-sharing arrangements are currently accepted in South Africa, as the 
country follows Chapter VIII of the OECD Guidelines. Multinationals in South Africa 
may therefore make use of cost-sharing arrangements to shift profits out of the 
country. However, payments made by a South African company may be subject to 
exchange control approval (Deloitte, 2014: 179). 
 
4.8.3. TRANSFER PRICING RULES ON INTER-COMPANY CHARGES 
 
A number of the schemes discussed comprise of payments between group 
companies, which are generally considered to be excessive, with the intention 
behind the scheme being to shift profits from a high tax jurisdiction to a low tax 
jurisdiction or tax haven. According to Sikka & Willmott (2010: 9), globalisation has 
created new complexities with respect to transfer pricing, as corporations are able to 
easily establish subsidiaries, affiliates, joint ventures, special purpose entities and 
trusts in more favourable tax jurisdictions. Since the allocation of costs and 
overheads are considered to be subjective, companies have the discretion to 
allocate them to particular products, services or geographical locations, thereby 
allowing such companies the opportunity to minimise their tax burdens (Sikka & 
Willmott, 2010: 3). 
 
It is submitted that the subjectivity involved in determining arm’s length prices 
represents an additional problem for tax authorities, especially where the goods or 
services in question do not have comparable market prices and are not widely 
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traded. Transfer pricing can therefore be considered to be an area that is subject to a 
significant amount of abuse by multinational corporations. Companies often use 
inter-company charges such as management fees to shift profits between entities 
within the group. 
 
The schemes used by Starbucks and SABMiller also reflect the use of inter-company 
transactions to shift profits – Starbucks allegedly procures coffee beans through a 
Swiss company, which are roasted at a subsidiary based in Amsterdam. Although 
the prices at which these transactions take place are not known, there is a possibility 
that these prices are not considered to be arm’s length, as inflated prices would 
allow for Starbucks to reduce profits in the UK by shifting money to its subsidiary in 
Switzerland, where commodities such as coffee are taxed at five per cent (UKUncut: 
Online). 
 
Similarly, SABMiller allegedly procures goods for its Ghanaian company from a 
company in Mauritius, a jurisdiction which levies tax at a maximum rate of three per 
cent for global business companies. Furthermore, the African and Indian group 
companies of SABMiller pay significant management fees to companies in 
Switzerland. 
 
It is evident that the use of transfer pricing arrangements and non-arm’s length 
prices enable multinational corporations to shift profits between tax jurisdictions in a 
manner that allows for the overall tax burden of the multinational company to be 
significantly reduced. South African transfer pricing legislation has recently been 
considerably revised in order to align with the OECD and international principles of 
taxation (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012). The amended provisions of section 31 of 
the Income Tax Act place a greater burden of proof on the taxpayer to demonstrate 
compliance with the arm’s length principle. However, as stated in Chapter Three of 
this thesis, no guidelines have been released by the SARS regarding the 
implementation of this section. Therefore, it is submitted that due to the lack of clarity 
and guidance in this regard, this is an area of income tax legislation that may still be 
subject to abuse. Furthermore, the application of transfer pricing legislation and 
arm’s length principles are complex and subjective, and require specialised skills 
within the SARS in order to ensure compliance with legislation. Due to the significant 
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changes to section 31 of the Income Tax Act, it is submitted that the SARS would 
have to ensure that the relevant staff are appropriately trained in order to review the 
application of transfer pricing regulations within multinational corporations. 
 
4.8.4. CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY RULES 
 
The US controlled foreign company rules contain a provision known as ―check-the-
box‖ – which effectively allows taxpayers to elect the classification of an entity either 
as a corporation or a pass-through entity. In electing the classification as a pass-
through entity, intra-group transactions are ignored (Ting, 2014: 51-52). 
 
In relation to Apple Inc., Ting (2014: 52) illustrates how the ―check-the-box‖ provision 
allows the company to use hybrid entities to avoid taxes. ASI sells products to other 
group distribution companies, which sell the products to customers in Europe and 
Asia. Using this structure, Apple Inc is able to shift a substantial portion of the profits 
made through sales in those countries, to ASI. Ordinarily, the profits in ASI would be 
subject to the controlled foreign company rules of US tax legislation. However, by 
―checking the box‖ for all subsidiaries of AOI, these subsidiaries are deemed to be 
part of AOI for US tax purposes. AOI is therefore regarded as having derived sales 
income directly from the end customers of ASI. Furthermore, the intra-group sales 
between ASI and the group distribution companies are effectively ignored (Ting, 
2014: 52). 
 
South African tax legislation does not contain an equivalent for the US ―check-the-
box‖ provision. However, it is submitted that should a multinational corporation in 
South Africa with a similar structure as Apple Inc.’s wish to avoid the controlled 
foreign company rules in the Republic, the use of ―foreign business establishments‖ 
could be relied on. In a structure similar to Apple Inc., the multinational corporation 
would merely need to ensure that the companies incorporated in Ireland meet the 
definition of a ―foreign business establishment‖ as outlined in section 9D of the 
Income Tax Act. Within a multinational structure, it is submitted that this would not be 
difficult, as the definition of ―foreign business establishment‖ contained within section 
9D, allows for the employees, equipment and facilities of other companies within the 
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group, located in the same country, to be taken into account in determining if there is 
a fixed place of business. 
 
4.8.5. THIN CAPITALISATION RULES IN RESPECT OF INTER-COMPANY 
LOANS 
 
The discussion of schemes employed by Starbucks and SABMiller revealed that 
companies within multinational groups are alleged to be thinly capitalised. This 
means that these companies make use of high levels of debt to claim a significant 
deduction for interest, thereby reducing taxable income in high tax jurisdictions. 
Generally, the loans are obtained from group companies located in low or no tax 
jurisdictions, allowing for the movement of profits to a company that would not be 
taxed on the corresponding interest income, or taxed at a lower rate (Buettner & 
Wamser, 2013: 63).  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis, thin capitalisation was previously dealt 
with in section 31(3) of the Income Tax Act, and Practice Note 2 (SARS, 1996) 
previously provided a safe harbour for companies. However, the amendments to 
section 31 have deleted the provisions of section 31(3) and rendered Practice Note 2 
no longer applicable. The current provisions of section 31 now incorporate thin 
capitalisation rules into transfer pricing rules, with the effect that the arm’s length 
principle must be applied to financial assistance as well. This means that in relation 
to South African companies, any interest paid on loans obtained from related parties 
will have to be shown to be computed at an arm’s length basis. Any excessive 
interest charges will therefore be disallowed as a deduction. In addition, the draft 
Interpretation Note (SARS, 2013a: 7) clarifies that the arm’s length principle applies 
to the amount of the debt as well. Taxpayers are therefore required to determine the 
amount of debt that could have been borrowed and would have been borrowed at 
arm’s length from an independent party and assess what portion of the related 
expenditure may not be deductible in terms of section 31 (SARS, 2013a: 7). 
However, as mentioned previously, there are currently no finalised guidelines from 
the SARS in this regard. To date, the draft Interpretation Note (SARS, 2013a) 
outlines, inter alia, the factors to be considered in determining whether a company is 
thinly capitalised. The lack of finalised guidelines are submitted to be a weakness in 
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relation to South Africa’s Income Tax Act, as without clarity on the application of the 
new provisions of section 31, it is possible that this section is more open to abuse by 
taxpayers. 
 
4.8.6. DOUBLE TAX AGREEMENTS – TREATY SHOPPING 
 
The scheme known as the ―double Irish arrangement‖ is an example of an 
arrangement which reflects an element of ―treaty shopping‖, a concept which was 
briefly discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
 
In order to successfully implement this scheme, a multinational company would have 
to ensure that the companies located in Ireland are not considered to be Irish 
residents for tax purposes. According to Thorne (2013: 8), an Irish company will not 
be treated as a tax resident even though it carries on trade in Ireland, if it is classified 
as a ―relevant company‖. In order to obtain the classification as a ―relevant 
company‖, it must be controlled by a European Union resident, or by a company 
residing in a country that has a double tax treaty with Ireland. In the case of Apple 
Inc. and Google, this classification is successful as Ireland and the US have a double 
tax agreement in force (Thorne, 2013: 9). This reveals how multinational 
corporations use the existence of double tax agreements for the ultimate purpose of 
tax avoidance. This exploitation of the existence of a double tax agreement between 
two countries is further extended by the arbitrage between the definitions of 
corporate residence in the two countries, which has been previously discussed in 
this chapter. 
 
It is submitted that the use of Dutch companies as trademark holders, as outlined in 
the scheme used by Starbucks and SABMiller, further illustrates an element of treaty 
shopping. For example, if a South African company within the SABMiller group pays 
royalties to the Dutch company, the tax treaty between South Africa and the 
Netherlands does not allow South Africa to levy a withholding tax on royalties 
beneficially owned by a resident of the Netherlands (SARS, 2009: Article 12). 
Similarly, the double tax treaty between the UK and Netherlands treats royalties in 
the same manner (HM Revenue & Customs, 2011: 18). By ensuring that the 
companies which hold the trademarks within the group are residents of the 
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Netherlands, multinational corporations such as Starbucks and SABMiller are able to 
ensure a further reduction in tax as withholding taxes do not apply in terms of the tax 
treaties.     
 
4.8.7. AVOIDANCE OF CLASSIFICATION AS A PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
 
In terms of tax treaties based on the OECD Model Tax Convention, taxing rights are 
normally granted to the state of residence, unless business is carried on through a 
permanent establishment in the other contracting state, in which case profits 
attributable to the permanent establishment may be taxed in the source state 
(Lamers, Mcharo & Nakajima, 2014: 18). 
  
Apple Inc. and Google are two multinational corporations which operate in the ―digital 
economy‖.  The sales made by these companies escape taxation in the source 
countries – by avoiding the classification as a permanent establishment. According 
to Lamers et al. (2014: 18), the concept of permanent establishment as defined in 
Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention is no longer appropriate to determine 
whether taxing rights exist in the source state, as within the digital economy, an 
enterprise is able to conduct business in one or more states outside its resident state 
without creating a permanent establishment in those states. According to Fuest et al. 
(2013: 5) multinationals using the ―double Irish with a Dutch sandwich‖ scheme often 
provide services and sell goods via the internet. Using the structure explained in the 
discussion of this scheme, the Irish resident company acts as the contractual partner 
of non-US customers, therefore no physical presence is created in the country of 
consumption. In the case of Google, it is Google Ireland Limited which acts as the 
contractual partner.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the OECD has provided guidelines to clarify the 
concept of permanent establishment in the context of e-commerce. These guidelines 
make reference to the physical location of the server (OECD, 2012c: 24), as well as 
the extent of the business carried on through the server, the involvement of 
personnel and whether the activities performed via the server are of a preparatory or 
auxiliary nature. 
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Lamers et al. (2014: 18) further submit that the status of permanent establishment is 
avoided by multinational corporations by artificially fragmenting their operations, in 
order to make use of the exception in terms of Article 5(4) of OECD Model Tax 
Convention, which excludes activities of a preparatory or auxiliary character from 
being classified as a permanent establishment. South Africa adopts the OECD 
definition of permanent establishment, therefore any weaknesses and loopholes 
identified in relation to the OECD definition, means that South Africa will be subject 
to similar tax schemes which exploit these weaknesses. Although beyond the scope 
of this thesis, it is considered relevant to note that the Value-Added Tax Act, 89 of 
1991 (hereinafter referred to as the VAT Act) now requires foreign suppliers of e-
commerce to register as Value-Added Tax (hereinafter referred to as VAT) vendors. 
Under the previous provisions of the VAT Act, suppliers of electronic services with no 
physical presence in South Africa were not required to register for VAT. Due to the 
difficulty in establishing a place of supply for e-commerce transactions, payment 
from a South African bank account or customer residence in South Africa will serve 
as the proxies to determine the place of supply (Watson, 2014: 16).    
 
4.9. CONCLUSION 
 
The significant rate of the growth of globalisation has facilitated an increase in the 
mobility of capital, resulting in an increase in the interaction between the economies 
of different countries. This has led to an increase in tax competition, a concept which 
was discussed in Chapter Two. Furthermore, the existence of tax havens and 
preferential tax regimes creates opportunities within global organisations to engage 
in tax arbitrage and profit shifting with the intention of reducing the overall tax burden 
of the organisation. It is submitted that the failure of tax legislation to keep up with 
the pace of globalisation has further resulted in increased opportunities for profit 
shifting. Chapter Two and Chapter Three of this thesis presented a detailed 
discussion of concepts associated with base erosion and profit shifting, and the 
legislative provisions within the Income Tax Act which address international 
transactions.   
 
The purpose of this chapter was to conduct a limited review of profit shifting 
schemes used by multinational corporations and use the components of these 
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schemes in order to identify the provisions within income tax legislation which were 
used by these companies to obtain tax benefits. In relation to South African income 
tax legislation, the weaknesses identified in this chapter can be summarised as 
follows: 
 
 the lack of formal definitions with respect to ―source‖ and determining 
corporate residence, specifically with regard to the ―place of effective 
management‖ as a determinant of residence; 
 the acceptance of cost-sharing arrangements as outlined in Chapter VIII of 
the OECD Guidelines, without the incorporation of corresponding specific 
provisions in transfer pricing legislation to prevent such arrangements from 
being used to shift profits; 
 the lack of guidelines in respect of the practical application of the amended 
section 31, which provides for transfer pricing and the lack of finalised 
guidelines in respect of thin capitalisation rules; 
 the perceived inability of legislation to counter the use of the ―foreign business 
establishment‖ exemption to circumvent controlled foreign company rules in 
terms of section 9D of the Income Tax Act; 
 outdated double tax agreements; and 
 the lack of legislative provisions to prevent the avoidance of classification as a 
permanent establishment due to the lack of a physical presence in respect of 
the digital economy and the use of the exception to Article 5(4) of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention, which excludes activities of a preparatory or auxiliary 
nature from classification as a permanent establishment. 
 
In revealing the ways in which multinational corporations exploit the provisions of the 
tax legislations of the various countries in which they operate, weaknesses within 
South African tax legislation were able to be identified. It is submitted that this is of 
significant importance in the global movement to address base erosion and profit 
shifting, as without this understanding, proper mechanisms to reduce the occurrence 
of profit shifting cannot be implemented. The next chapter outlines the current 
initiatives towards addressing the problem of base erosion and profit shifting, from 
both a global and a South African perspective.  
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CHAPTER 5:  CURRENT INITIATIVES TOWARDS REDUCING BASE EROSION 
AND PROFIT SHIFTING 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapters of this thesis focussed on important concepts in relation to 
base erosion and profit shifting, as well as the provisions contained within the 
Income Tax Act which govern international tax consequences. Furthermore, certain 
schemes used by multinational corporations were reviewed in Chapter Four, the 
purpose of which was to identify weaknesses and loopholes in income tax 
legislation. 
 
This chapter addresses the fourth goal of the research: to review the current 
initiatives to address base erosion and profit shifting, both within South Africa and 
from a global perspective. This chapter discusses the OECD’s action plan and other 
global initiatives to address base erosion and profit shifting (insofar as they are 
considered to be relevant to the schemes and legislative weaknesses identified in 
this thesis), as well as South Africa’s initiatives towards addressing the problem of 
base erosion and profit shifting.  The fact that South Africa is a developing country 
necessitates that due consideration be given to foreign direct investment, as it is 
important that South Africa is seen as an attractive investment country. Therefore 
this chapter also includes a brief discussion on the potential impact of efforts to 
address base erosion and profit shifting, on levels of foreign direct investment into 
South Africa.   
 
5.2. OECD INITIATIVE TOWARDS ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND 
PROFIT SHIFTING 
 
The OECD’s project on base erosion and profit shifting resulted in the release of an 
action plan in July 2013, which entails addressing key elements of the international 
tax consequences which govern multinational corporations (Picciotto, 2013: 1105). 
The OECD (2013a: 11) has recognised that fundamental changes are required to 
prevent double non-taxation and stresses that coherence of corporate income tax at 
an international level is required, as unilateral action taken by countries may result in 
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uncertainty and unrelieved double taxation. The OECD action plan consists of fifteen 
actions aimed at addressing base erosion and profit shifting, which are based on 
three core principles: coherence, substance and transparency (OECD: Online). In 
addition, the action plan contains two further actions which fall outside the above 
core principles – one in relation to the digital economy, and the other relating to a 
multilateral instrument. Since the focus of this thesis is limited to income tax, the 
fifteen actions are discussed briefly below without reference to indirect tax 
considerations.  Furthermore, the discussion of each action includes a brief update in 
respect of the progress made, as well as any shortcomings identified. 
 
Action One: Address the tax challenges of the digital economy 
The purpose of this action is to identify the main difficulties created by the digital 
economy, within income tax legislation. Issues include, inter alia, the ability of a 
company to have a significant digital presence in a country without being liable for 
taxes in that country due to the lack of nexus under current tax legislation, the 
attribution of value created from the generation of location-relevant data, the 
characterisation of income and the application of related source rules. The OECD 
(2013a: 15) submits that this will require a detailed analysis of the various business 
models in this sector. 
 
It is submitted that this action is of importance in relation to multinational 
corporations, as many are operating within the digital economy, such as Apple Inc. 
and Google, as discussed in Chapter Four. Furthermore, it is submitted that 
schemes such as the ―double Irish with a Dutch sandwich‖ work particularly well 
within the digital economy, due to the lack of a physical presence, thereby allowing 
such corporations to escape taxation in the source countries in which the income 
arises. 
 
This action constituted one of the seven deliverables in 2014 according to the 
anticipated timelines of the action plan (OECD, 2013a: 29-34). In this regard, the 
OECD (2014b: 8) has stated that it has been agreed that since the digital economy is 
fast becoming the economy within which many countries and organisations operate, 
it would be difficult to ring-fence the digital economy from the rest of the economy for 
tax purposes.  However, it is acknowledged that the features of the digital economy 
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represent risks in relation to base erosion and profit shifting, and therefore need to 
be addressed. According to the Explanatory Statement: OECD/G20 Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting Project (hereinafter referred to as the Explanatory Statement) 
issued by the OECD (2014b: 8), it is anticipated that other actions included in the 
action plan will address the risks represented by the digital economy, and these 
actions, where applicable, should specifically address any issues related to the 
digital economy.  
 
Actions which fall within the core principle of coherence of corporate income 
taxation: 
 
Action Two: Neutralise the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements 
This action addresses the mismatches in the way entities and instruments are 
treated by different tax jurisdictions, which allows companies to claim multiple 
deductions for the same expense or cause taxable income to ―disappear‖ through 
the use of hybrid entities (OECD: Online).  
 
The OECD (2014b: 5) has released recommendations in this regard as part of its 
2014 deliverables. These recommendations relate to changes in domestic tax 
legislation and tax treaty provisions which would eliminate mismatches, and include 
a recommendation to link domestic rules, which effectively means that the treatment 
of an amount in one jurisdiction would be linked to the treatment in the other 
jurisdiction (Musviba, 2014: Online). The OECD report further recommends the 
addition of a new provision to Article 1 of the OECD Model Tax Treaty, which would 
address the income of fiscally transparent entities (Musviba, 2014: Online). The 
detailed recommendations outlined in the report are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Action Three: Strengthen controlled foreign company rules 
This action addresses the concern that income is routed through offshore entities in 
order to escape taxation. The OECD (Online) is of the opinion that strong controlled 
foreign company rules can address this issue by including the income of the offshore 
entities in the parent company’s income on a current basis. 
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Action Three forms part of the 2015 deliverables of the OECD (2013a: 30), and 
accordingly no recommendations have been released to date. According to Picciotto 
(2013: 1106), when controlled foreign company rules first emerged, Switzerland’s 
authorities argued that since tax treaties define and allocate taxing rights, a 
residence country cannot use anti-avoidance provisions to tax income of foreign 
affiliates incorporated in treaty-partner states. The decentralisation and multi-tier 
structures of multinational corporations, as well as the operation within the digital 
economy have made controlled foreign company rules increasingly difficult to 
implement (Picciotto, 2013: 1107).  
 
From a South African tax perspective, it is submitted that the complexity of current 
controlled foreign company rules, as well as the complex structures within 
multinational corporations, makes the application of the anti-avoidance provisions of 
section 9D difficult. Picciotto (2014: 6) submits that controlled foreign company rules 
would be more effective if they were co-ordinated and targeted against preferential 
tax regimes. It is submitted that since South Africa is considered to be a developing 
country, it would benefit from stronger controlled foreign company rules, as this 
would discourage the diversion of investments by South African resident companies 
into foreign affiliates in order to obtain tax benefits. 
 
Action Four: Limit base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments 
This action addresses the use of excessive interest deductions by companies to 
reduce their taxable profits, by obtaining a loan from a related entity which benefits 
from a low-tax regime, thereby avoiding a corresponding interest income inclusion in 
the taxable income of the lender. Furthermore, a company may use debt to finance 
the production of exempt or deferred income, while claiming a current deduction for 
interest (OECD, 2013a: 17). The OECD recommends that the rules relating to the 
deductibility of such interest should take these schemes into account. The action 
plan proposes the evaluation of the effectiveness of different limitations of such 
deductions and suggests that transfer pricing guidance will be developed in this 
regard (OECD, 2013a: 31).  
 
Picciotto (2014: 6) submits that the limitation of such deductions could reduce tax 
losses within countries, but that many developing countries have been reluctant to 
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adopt such measures for fear of discouraging inward investment. However, it is 
submitted that South Africa does not display such reluctance, as the Income Tax Act 
already contains provisions which govern thin capitalisation – which is dealt with 
under section 31. The amended provisions of this section already require that thin 
capitalisation be considered within transfer pricing rules. According to the 
Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (National Treasury, 
2010: 75), the aim of the amendments to section 31 of the Income Tax Act was to 
align with OECD guidelines. It is therefore submitted that South Africa is likely to 
implement any further guidelines issued by the OECD in this regard. 
 
Action Five: Counter harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into account 
transparency and substance 
The OECD (2013a: 18) proposes to refocus on past work done to address harmful 
tax practices, and to prioritise improving on transparency, including compulsory 
spontaneous exchange on rulings relating to preferential tax regimes. Furthermore, 
non-OECD members will be engaged in addressing this action.  
 
As part of its 2014 deliverables in terms of the action plan, the OECD (2014b: 9) has 
released an interim report on this action. This report states that the focus will be on 
requiring substantial activity to access the benefits of preferential tax regimes, 
improving transparency and the compulsory exchange of information on rulings for 
preferential regimes and reviewing member and associate country regimes 
(Musviba, 2014: Online). It is submitted that the detailed contents of the interim 
report are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, based on the discussion in 
Chapter Two on harmful tax practices, it is evident that this action is considered to be 
important in the context of reducing base erosion and profit shifting. 
 
Actions which fall within the core principle of the alignment of taxation and 
substance: 
 
Action Six: Prevent treaty abuse 
The OECD (2013a: 19) aims to develop model treaty provisions and 
recommendations regarding domestic tax rules to prevent the granting of treaty 
benefits in inappropriate circumstances. The OECD (2013a: 18) submits that treaty 
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anti-abuse clauses, together with the exercise of taxing rights under domestic tax 
legislations will help to restore source taxation to a large extent. The OECD aims to 
clarify the tax policy considerations that countries should take into account before 
entering into a tax treaty. 
 
The OECD Explanatory Statement (2014b: 6) states that all countries have agreed 
that anti-treaty abuse provisions should be incorporated into tax treaties. It has 
further been acknowledged that the work on addressing treaty abuse may impact 
existing business structures and this may require improvements to existing policies 
in order not to negatively affect investments, trade and economic growth (OECD, 
2014b: 6). Chapter Four of this thesis discussed the abuse of double tax agreements 
by multinational corporations. It is submitted that the adoption of anti-treaty abuse 
provisions within such agreements, could effectively counter tax avoidance schemes 
which contain treaty shopping components. Chapter Three of this thesis outlined a 
number of weaknesses within tax treaties of South Africa. It is therefore submitted, 
that in addition to the introduction of anti-abuse provisions within tax treaties, the 
weaknesses identified should be addressed.   
 
Action Seven: Prevent the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status 
According to the OECD (Online), in terms of treaty rules, a country may not tax 
business profits of a foreign company unless the company has a permanent 
establishment in that country. If the company is not taxed on those profits in its 
country of residence, double non-taxation arises. The OECD (2013a: 19) proposes 
to change the definition of permanent establishment to prevent the artificial 
avoidance of permanent establishment status. 
 
This action is expected to be met with a deliverable in 2015 (OECD, 2013a: 32). 
However, there are a number of concerns regarding the apparent lack of intention of 
the OECD to reconsider the ―separate entity‖ principle first implemented in 2008 
through changes to the commentary to Article 7 to the OECD Model Tax Convention, 
and by amending the Article itself in 2010 (Picciotto, 2013: 1109). This approach was 
rejected by the United Nations tax committee and by many developing countries 
(including South Africa), and some OECD-member countries, due to the complexity 
of the implementation of such changes, as well as possible conflicts with domestic 
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tax legislation (Picciotto, 2013: 1110). Effectively, this change to Article 7 treats a 
permanent establishment as a separate legal entity and applies transfer pricing rules 
to such establishments (Oguttu, 2009: 773). Picciotto (2014: 6) submits that without 
a reconsideration of these issues, it is unlikely that adequate solutions can be found, 
especially in relation to the problems posed by the digital economy. It is submitted 
that this could result in unilateral action by countries, which is not in keeping with the 
need for coherence on an international basis in order for base erosion and profit 
shifting to be addressed effectively.   
 
The discussion in Chapter Four regarding schemes used by multinational companies 
that avoid classification as a permanent establishment supports the need to address 
this problem in order to reduce base erosion and profit shifting. This problem is 
further exacerbated by the operation of certain companies within the digital economy 
and the ability of multinational companies to artificially fragment operations (Lamers 
et al., 2014: 18). It is therefore submitted that changes to the concept of permanent 
establishment should take these problems into account. 
 
Actions Eight, Nine and Ten: Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with 
value creation 
The OECD (Online) states that the purpose of transfer pricing rules is to allocate 
income earned by a multinational corporation among the countries in which it 
operates. In some cases, multinational companies have misapplied the rules to 
separate income from the economic activities that produce such income. This is 
achieved through transfers of intangibles or other mobile assets, over-capitalisation 
of group companies and contractual allocations of risk. The actions outlined by the 
OECD aim to develop rules to prevent the base erosion and profit shifting 
mechanisms outlined above.   
 
The OECD 2014 deliverables include a report on action eight, which is to assure that 
transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation with specific reference to 
intangibles (OECD, 2013a: 32). Deliverables in respect of actions nine and ten are 
expected in 2015. According to Picciotto (2014: 7), the OECD Guidelines on 
Intangibles indicates a move away from the attribution of profits derived from 
intangible assets on the basis of ownership or provision of finance, which allowed 
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multinational corporations such as Google to accumulate significant profits in low-tax 
jurisdictions such as Bermuda – this has been discussed in Chapter Four of this 
thesis. In terms of the guidelines, profits would be attributed based on each entity’s 
contribution to ―value creation‖ through functions performed, assets used and risks 
assumed. Picciotto (2014: 7) further submits that the draft guidelines of the OECD do 
not provide clear guidance in terms of how these contributions to value creation can 
be assessed. The tax schemes discussed in Chapter Four indicate that transfer 
pricing is a common scheme used to shift profits, and such schemes contribute to 
tax avoidance in South Africa. Therefore, it is submitted that these actions 
contemplated by the OECD are important from a South African tax perspective. 
South Africa has recently amended its transfer pricing legislation to align with the 
OECD guidelines (National Treasury, 2010: 75) and therefore any further guidelines 
issued by the OECD are likely to be followed by South Africa, However, it is 
submitted that it is important that the OECD guidelines are clear and outline the 
application of transfer pricing provisions, as the effectiveness of this legislation is 
dependent on the enforcement of its provisions. Furthermore, as mentioned 
previously, no guidelines in relation to the amended transfer pricing legislation have 
been released by the SARS to date.    
 
Actions which fall within the core principle of ensuring transparency, while improving 
certainty: 
 
Action Eleven: Establish methodologies to collect and analyse data on base erosion 
and profit shifting and the actions to address it 
According to the OECD (Online), further work is required in order to measure the 
scale and effects of base erosion and profit shifting, and to monitor the effectiveness 
and impact of the actions taken to address this issue. 
 
This is one of the actions expected as a deliverable in 2015. It is submitted that the 
aim of this action is to establish a reliable way in which to measure the effects of 
base erosion and profit shifting and to regularly monitor these measures in order to 
establish whether actions undertaken in the plan to address this problem have the 
intended effect of reducing the occurrence of base erosion and profit shifting. It is 
further submitted that this action is important as it can assist in providing an 
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indication as to whether actions implemented are successful or whether further 
changes are necessary. However, it appears that the monitoring of such measures is 
not anticipated to yield reliable data unless proposed actions to address base 
erosion and profit shifting are coherently implemented on a global level. It is 
submitted that unilateral measures taken by countries could distort any 
measurements to establish the effectiveness of actions taken. 
 
Action Twelve: Require taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax planning 
arrangements 
The OECD (2013a: 22) plans to develop recommendations regarding the design of 
mandatory disclosure requirements for aggressive tax planning arrangements or 
structures. One area of focus will be international tax schemes, where the work will 
explore using a wide definition of ―tax benefit‖ in order to capture such transactions. 
Other potentially useful measures include co-operative compliance programmes 
between taxpayers and tax administrations, in order to enhance information sharing. 
 
Recommendations by the OECD in this regard are expected during 2015. It is 
submitted that any disclosure requirements imposed on taxpayers may be met with 
opposition from multinational corporations. It is further submitted that disclosure 
requirements for taxpayers should not be made unduly onerous.     
 
Action Thirteen: Re-examine transfer pricing documentation 
The aim of this action is to develop rules regarding transfer pricing documentation 
which would enhance the transparency for tax administrations, while taking into 
account the costs of compliance for business. The rules will include a requirement 
that multinational corporations provide all relevant governments with information on 
their global allocation of income, economic activity and taxes paid among countries, 
based on a common template (OECD, 2013a: 23). 
 
In relation to this action, the OECD has released a report comprising guidance on 
transfer pricing documentation and country-by-country reporting (Musviba, 2014: 
Online), which sets out revised standards for tax administrations to take into account 
with respect to transfer pricing documentation, and sets out a template for country-
by-country reporting of income, earnings, taxes, and certain measures of economic 
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activity. The implementation of the guidelines provided in this report will be 
addressed by the OECD in the near future, taking into account factors such as the 
protection of the confidentiality of this information (Musviba, 2014: Online).  
 
Action Fourteen: Make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective 
The actions identified to counter the occurrence of base erosion and profit shifting 
will need to be complemented with actions to ensure the certainty and predictability 
needed in order to promote investment (OECD: Online). This action aims to ensure 
that solutions are developed in order to address obstacles that prevent countries 
from solving treaty-related disputes, including the absence of arbitration provisions in 
most treaties (OECD, 2013a: 23). 
 
According to Picciotto (2013: 1113), although arbitration provisions have been 
introduced into many treaties, a number of states are reluctant to include such 
provisions, especially developing countries. Since this action forms part of the 2015 
deliverables, it is submitted that it remains to be seen what the recommendations are 
from the OECD in this regard, and whether all countries involved in the base erosion 
and profit shifting project are able to achieve consensus in this regard.  
 
Actions that address the need for swift implementation of the measures: 
 
Action Fifteen: Develop a multilateral instrument 
Many of the actions identified could result in changes to the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, which will not be effective without corresponding amendments to 
bilateral tax treaties. The OECD (2013a: 24) recognises that if these changes are 
undertaken on a treaty-by-treaty basis, the process of implementation would be 
prolonged. A multilateral instrument to amend bilateral treaties has been identified as 
a possible solution to this problem. 
 
The OECD has released a Multilateral Instrument Report which concludes that a 
multilateral instrument is feasible (based on non-tax precedents) and desirable as it 
would ensure the sustainability of the consensual framework to eliminate double 
taxation on cross-border transactions (Musviba, 2014: Online). An international 
convention to begin negotiations for a multilateral instrument is to be set up in 2015, 
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and Musviba (2014: Online) submits that such an instrument is likely to co-exist with 
existing bilateral treaty networks. Furthermore, the Convention on Mutual Assistance 
in Tax Matters, which is an example of a multilateral instrument to counter global tax 
avoidance and to allow revenue authorities to co-operate and assist each other in 
the collection and recovery of taxes, has been signed by sixty-six countries 
(Musviba, 2014: Online), including South Africa.   
 
5.3. OTHER GLOBAL INITIATIVES  
 
5.3.1. THE UNITED NATIONS 
 
In October 2013, the United Nations Committee of Experts on International Co-
operation in Tax Matters established a subcommittee on base erosion and profit 
shifting issues for developing countries (United Nations: Online). This subcommittee 
is mandated to draw on its experience and engaged with other bodies, such as the 
OECD, with a view to monitoring developments in relation to base erosion and profit 
shifting issues, and communicating on such issues to officials in developing 
countries. The aim of establishing this subcommittee is to help to keep developing 
countries informed and to help facilitate the input of developing countries into the 
OECD/G20 action plan on base erosion and profit shifting (United Nations: Online). 
However, based on the literature review undertaken for this thesis, no significant 
outcomes or reports from this committee were found.  
 
5.3.2. IRELAND 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, one of the tactics used by multinational corporations 
is the arbitrage between corporate residence definitions across different tax 
jurisdictions. An example of a scheme which uses this tactic is the ―double Irish 
arrangement‖. In order to address this problem, Ireland has amended its corporate 
residence rules to ensure that an Irish-incorporated company can no longer be used 
to exploit this loophole. The amendment provides that if an Irish-incorporated 
company is managed and controlled in a treaty-partner country and such company 
would not be regarded as a tax resident in any jurisdiction due to the mismatch in 
corporate residence definitions between Ireland and the treaty-partner country, then 
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such company will be regarded as a tax resident in Ireland (Mayer Brown Practices, 
2014: 8).  
 
The amendment was effective from 24 October 2013 for companies incorporated on 
or after that date and from 01 January 2015 for companies incorporated before 24 
October 2013. However, this amendment will not affect the tax residence of Irish 
companies managed and controlled in non-treaty partner jurisdictions, such as the 
Cayman Islands (Mayer Brown Practices, 2014: 8). Therefore it is submitted that the 
amendment to Irish tax legislation does not fully address schemes such as the 
―double Irish arrangement‖, where no tax treaty exists between Ireland and the tax 
haven state chosen for the company within the scheme. Google’s ―double Irish with a 
Dutch sandwich‖ scheme, for example, would still be effective, as no tax treaty exists 
between Ireland and Bermuda. However, it appears that Apple Inc.’s double non-
taxation of profits under the tax structure discussed in Chapter Five could be affected 
by Ireland’s change in legislation, as the US and Ireland have a tax treaty in force. It 
is submitted that the negotiation of tax treaties between Ireland and the tax haven 
countries (those which have not yet entered into a double tax agreement with 
Ireland) seems to be a way in which the ―double Irish arrangement‖ can be rendered 
ineffective in the context of base erosion and profit shifting.    
 
5.4. INITIATIVES UNDERTAKEN BY SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5.4.1. INVOLVEMENT IN THE OECD ACTION PLAN 
 
As mentioned in Chapter One, South Africa is not an OECD-member country. 
However, South Africa does form part of the G20, which was involved in the work 
undertaken by the OECD to address base erosion and profit shifting, and all G20 
countries participated in the meeting of the Committee of Fiscal Affairs at which the 
first set of deliverables in terms of the action plan was adopted (OECD, 2014b: 4). It 
appears that all G20 countries, including South Africa are in agreement with the 
action plan and 2014 deliverables of the OECD. The Explanatory Statement (OECD, 
2014b: 3) states that the proposed measures in respect of seven of the actions 
outlined in the action plan have been agreed upon and reflect consensus. However, 
certain measures have not been finalised as they may be affected by 2015 
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deliverables in terms of the action plan timelines. The seven 2014 deliverables 
include two final reports on Action One and Action Fifteen, one interim report on 
Action Five, and four reports containing draft recommendations on Actions Two, Six, 
Eight and Thirteen (OECD, 2014b: 9). The OECD (2014b: 4) states that developing 
countries and other non-OECD/G20 economies have been extensively consulted in 
the process of drafting recommendations.  
 
It appears that, based on South Africa’s involvement in the base erosion and profit 
shifting project through its membership of the G20, current recommendations of the 
OECD are consistent with South Africa’s overall intention to reduce base erosion and 
profit shifting. South Africa is also a member of the African Tax Administration 
Forum, and through its membership of this organisation – which has urged African 
countries to provide input to the OECD – also demonstrates a commitment towards 
addressing base erosion and profit shifting (South African Institute of Tax 
Professionals, 2014: Online). However, the extent of South Africa’s intention to adopt 
the recommendations of the OECD is not yet known. It is submitted that once all the 
deliverables of the OECD action plan have been issued, and recommendations 
finalised, all countries would be in a better position to make a decision regarding 
potential changes to legislation and tax treaties. Furthermore, it is submitted that the 
work of the Davis Tax Committee (see below) will affect the outcome of the base 
erosion and profit shifting project, from a South African perspective. 
 
5.4.2. SOUTH AFRICA’S DAVIS TAX COMMITTEE 
 
The former Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, initiated a tax review in 2013, and 
the terms of reference (National Treasury, 2013b: Online) for the Davis Tax 
Committee includes a focus on base erosion and profit shifting. On 30 June 2014, 
the Davis Tax Committee submitted an interim report on base erosion and profit 
shifting to the Minister of Finance (The Davis Tax Committee, 2013: Online). The 
contents of this interim report have not been published, but it is an indication that the 
issue of base erosion and profit shifting currently still forms part of the main focus 
within South Africa. To date, the extent of the work undertaken by the Davis Tax 
Committee with respect to base erosion and profit shifting and any findings in 
relation to the problem are not known to the public. 
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5.5. CONSIDERATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INTO SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
Foreign direct investment is defined as an investment made by a company or entity 
in one country, into a company or entity based in another country (Investopedia: 
Online). It is submitted that since South Africa is considered to be a developing 
country, an important consideration from an economic perspective, is that of foreign 
direct investment into the country. It is possible that imposing stricter rules in the 
Income Tax Act in relation to international tax issues may result in less investment 
into South Africa by multinational companies. However, tax legislation is not 
considered to be the main driver behind foreign direct investment. Therefore, in order 
to assess the possible impact of changes in tax legislation, it is necessary to 
establish the extent to which it is considered to affect investment decisions. 
 
According to Terhoeven (2011: 62) a comparison between Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa revealed that there does not seem to be a significant 
relationship between tax policies and foreign direct investment into these countries. 
However, other studies discussed by Terhoeven (2011: 62) indicate that factors such 
as lower corporate tax rates, tax holidays and the existence of double tax 
agreements with other countries do influence levels of foreign direct investments and 
can increase the attractiveness of a country as an investment opportunity.     
 
According to the International Monetary Fund (2014: 24) addressing tax avoidance 
by multinational corporations may discourage investment into a country. However, in 
the context of a developing country, there are factors that could be seen to be more 
important, such as infrastructure and labour costs which attract investment into 
countries. It is submitted that the loss of tax revenue from multinational companies, 
and the negative effect that the imbalance of tax burdens borne by taxpayers can 
have on tax morale, are considered to be of significance. Furthermore, judging by 
the quantum of the estimated losses in tax revenue due to schemes used by 
multinational corporations, it is submitted that any reduction in inward investment into 
the country may be offset, at least partially, by an increase in tax revenue arising 
from a decrease in tax avoidance schemes. Furthermore, it is submitted that due to 
the current media focus on base erosion and profit shifting, initiatives by tax 
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jurisdictions to address this problem can assist to increase taxpayer morale, as it 
reflects a tax authority’s commitment to fairness. The International Monetary Fund 
(2014: 24) further submits that the impact of tax avoidance initiatives on investment 
within a country can be reduced if the number of countries participating in such 
initiatives is significant. This supports the view of the OECD (2013a: 11), which has 
emphasised the importance of coherence at an international level, and stressed that 
unilateral actions taken by countries could have negative consequences. It is 
submitted that the views of the International Monetary Fund and the OECD in this 
regard reflect the fact that consideration has been given to foreign direct investment 
within the context of addressing base erosion and profit shifting and accordingly, any 
recommendations should take this factor into account, especially given that South 
Africa and other developing countries appear to have adequate representation and 
involvement in the base erosion and profit shifting project.  
 
5.6. CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter Four of this thesis set out a review of the schemes commonly used by 
multinational corporations and the associated weaknesses in tax legislation which 
these schemes exploited.  The aim of this chapter was to discuss the current 
initiatives designed to address the problem of base erosion and profit shifting, in 
order to establish whether the weaknesses identified in Chapter Four are being 
adequately addressed. Based on the initiatives discussed above, it is submitted that 
although the OECD action plan takes into account many of the weaknesses of tax 
legislation that are exploited by multinational companies, at this stage the strength of 
any recommendations cannot be determined conclusively, as the project will only 
deliver expected outputs on all actions by 2015. It is submitted that many of the 
actions within the action plan are inter-dependent and can only be finalised once the 
base erosion and profit shifting project has met all deliverables.  However, based on 
the discussion in this chapter of the initiatives to address base erosion and profit 
shifting, it is evident that many proposals and recommendations contain weaknesses 
as they fail to consider certain aspects of the schemes used by multinational 
corporations – for example certain components of the ―double Irish arrangement‖ 
have not been addressed. Furthermore, although the actions set out within the 
OECD action plan seem to address many weaknesses in tax legislation, it appears 
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that currently there are insufficient guidelines regarding the implementation of 
recommendations made to date. 
 
It is therefore submitted that the base erosion and profit shifting project has a 
substantial amount of work still to be done in order to provide a cohesive report on 
how this problem can be addressed at an international level. Furthermore, the extent 
of the implementation of OECD recommendations by different tax legislation remains 
to be seen. However, based on South Africa’s involvement in the movement to 
address base erosion and profit shifting, it appears that South Africa will follow 
OECD guidelines to a large extent.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter concludes the study and makes recommendations in respect of the 
research undertaken by drawing on the findings of previous chapters. This is 
achieved through restating the goals of the research, followed by a discussion of 
how these goals were achieved, including recommendations on possible 
amendments to South African income tax legislation to address the challenges of 
base erosion and profit shifting. A brief discussion of the limitations of the research 
undertaken follows, and finally, areas for further research are identified.  
 
6.2. THE GOALS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The goal of the research was to undertake a study of tax avoidance schemes 
employed by multinational corporations, which contribute to base erosion and profit 
shifting, and to examine the components of these schemes in order to identify 
weaknesses within South Africa’s income tax legislation in relation to the provisions 
that govern international transactions. The goal was further extended to the 
identification of potential amendments to legislation, using the weaknesses 
uncovered in the research, which may assist in reducing the occurrence of base 
erosion and profit shifting.   
 
6.3. HOW THE RESEARCH GOALS WERE ACHIEVED 
 
Firstly, a review of the concept of base erosion and profit shifting, as well as 
associated issues such as harmful tax competition and harmful tax practices (which 
is the collective reference to tax havens and preferential tax regimes) was 
considered necessary. This was addressed in Chapter Two which concluded that the 
background and effects of these practices are similar and that harmful tax 
competition and harmful tax practices are contributing factors to base erosion and 
profit shifting. This inference was important in the context of addressing the main 
goal of the research, as the schemes used by multinational corporations reflected 
that the issues and concepts discussed in Chapter Two are employed as 
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components of tax avoidance schemes. Furthermore, the discussion of base erosion 
and profit shifting in this chapter provided an insight into the overlap between 
domestic tax legislations that are prey to such schemes, due to increased cross-
border transactions. This provided a basis against which to consider the actual tax 
schemes of multinational companies, as these schemes demonstrated such 
overlaps. 
 
Secondly, in order to identify how base erosion and profit shifting schemes exploit 
gaps in tax legislation, it was considered necessary to discuss the provisions within 
the Income Tax Act which govern international transactions. Chapter Two 
demonstrated that base erosion and profit shifting is a problem which emanates from 
the exploitation of gaps and mismatches in tax legislation. Therefore Chapter Three 
was aimed at providing an understanding of the definitions and provisions in South 
African tax legislation, which are relevant to cross-border transactions. 
 
Chapter Four of this thesis comprised of a review of schemes used by four 
multinational companies – Apple Inc., Google, Starbucks and SABMiller. The 
components of these schemes were linked to the underlying gaps in tax legislation 
that were exploited in order to reduce the tax burdens of these companies. These 
gaps were subsequently reviewed from a South African perspective with reference to 
the provisions of South African tax legislation discussed in Chapter Three. This 
enabled the identification of gaps and loopholes within South Africa’s Income Tax 
Act. 
 
Finally, Chapter Five presented a discussion of the current global and South African 
initiatives aimed at addressing the problem of base erosion and profit shifting. The 
purpose of this chapter was to establish what recommendations have been made in 
relation to the legislative weaknesses identified in Chapter Four and to identify any 
shortcomings in these recommendations. Furthermore, considerations from a South 
African perspective were suggested and a brief discussion of foreign direct 
investment into South Africa was included. The purpose of this chapter was to justify 
the submission of recommendations in respect of the weaknesses identified in 
Chapter Four.  This therefore addressed the extended goal of this research. 
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In addressing the main goal, the following weaknesses in South African tax 
legislation were identified and discussed in Chapter Four:  
 
 the lack of formal definitions with respect to ―source‖ and determining 
corporate residence, specifically with regard to the ―place of effective 
management‖ as a determinant of residence; 
 the acceptance of cost-sharing arrangements as outlined in Chapter VIII of 
the OECD Guidelines, without the incorporation of corresponding specific 
provisions in transfer pricing legislation to prevent such arrangements from 
being used to shift profits; 
 the lack of guidelines in respect of the practical application of the amended 
section 31, which provides for transfer pricing and the lack of finalised 
guidelines in respect of thin capitalisation rules; 
 the perceived inability of legislation to counter the use of the ―foreign business 
establishment‖ exemption to circumvent controlled foreign company rules in 
terms of section 9D of the Income Tax Act; 
 outdated double tax agreements; and 
 the lack of legislative provisions to prevent the avoidance of classification as a 
permanent establishment due to the lack of a physical presence in respect of 
the digital economy and the use of the exception to Article 5(4) of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention, which excludes activities of a preparatory or auxiliary 
nature from classification as a permanent establishment. 
 
6.4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The following submissions are made in relation to each of the weaknesses identified: 
 
 Interpretation Note 6 (SARS, 2002) should be revised (or replaced) in order to 
provide clear guidelines in respect of the term ―place of effective 
management‖, taking the OECD guidelines into consideration, particularly in 
light of the principles applied in the Oceanic Trust Co. Ltd case. In addition, a 
clear definition of ―source‖ is required. Furthermore, the application of these 
terms within the digital economy should be addressed. 
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 With regard to cost-sharing agreements, it is submitted that the OECD 
recommendation that these arrangements should be aligned with value 
creation is adopted in South Africa. However, based on the discussion in 
Chapter Five, it appears that the OECD guidelines in this regard are not clear, 
therefore prior to implementation in South Africa, it should be ensured that 
that these guidelines are extensively reviewed in terms of their relevance and 
clarity; and that any shortcomings have been addressed.  
 In respect of transfer pricing, in addition to the submission in respect of cost-
sharing agreements, it is further recommended that concise guidelines with 
reference to section 31 of the Income Tax Act are provided in order to 
minimize the risk of uncertainty in applying the provisions of this section. This 
can be in the form of an interpretation note or practice note issued by the 
SARS. 
 With regard to thin capitalisation, it is submitted that the existing draft 
Interpretation Note (SARS, 2013a) should be finalised as a matter of urgency, 
with due consideration to the OECD guidelines, in view of the fact that thin 
capitalisation is now incorporated into South Africa’s transfer pricing rules in 
an effort to align them with OECD principles. 
 The ―foreign business establishment‖ exclusion in section 9D of the Income 
Tax Act should be revised to restrict the use of the employees, equipment and 
facilities of other group companies located in the same country for the 
purpose of the determination of the presence of a fixed place of business, due 
to the ease with which multinational corporations are able to meet the 
requirements to be classified as a foreign business establishment.   
 Double tax agreements should be updated to take factors such as e-
commerce into account. Furthermore, as suggested by the OECD, an anti-
treaty abuse provision may be introduced into these agreements, to counter 
schemes which lead to double non-taxation through treaty shopping. 
 It is submitted that the OECD definition of ―permanent establishment‖ should 
be amended to provide for the digital economy. In this regard, more 
consideration than is currently given to e-commerce is necessary, since the 
current guidelines do not appear to be strong enough to prevent the artificial 
avoidance of classification as a permanent establishment.     
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6.5. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
For the purposes of this research, an interpretative approach was adopted and the 
research was conducted in the form of an extended argument, supported by 
documentary evidence. The studies conducted in respect of schemes used by 
multinational corporations were limited to a review of information currently within the 
public domain and the quantification of losses in tax revenue was also limited in this 
regard. No empirical studies were conducted or reviewed in respect of the tax losses 
suffered from base erosion and profit shifting. Furthermore, the weaknesses within 
income tax legislation identified were limited to the schemes discussed in relation to 
the multinational companies selected for further study. The review of current 
initiatives and the recommendations outlined in this research were limited to the 
weaknesses identified. Therefore there are potentially other provisions which govern 
international transactions within the Income Tax Act which require amendments to 
counter those avoidance schemes that have not been discussed within the ambit of 
this thesis. Due to the fact that the initiatives to address base erosion and profit 
shifting are still a work-in-progress, the strengths and weaknesses thereof could not 
be conclusively identified in this research.  
 
6.6. FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Considering the limitations of the research undertaken, it is submitted that further 
research can be conducted in respect of the schemes used by other multinational 
corporations and how the associated legislative weaknesses in the Income Tax Act 
can be addressed in relation to these schemes. In addition, the OECD action plan 
can be further analysed, with detailed consideration being given to the OECD 
deliverables and whether the detailed recommendations contained therein are 
suitable from a South African tax perspective.  A critical analysis of the OECD 
recommendations (once they are finalised) can be undertaken in order to establish 
whether they would effectively curb base erosion and profit shifting, or whether 
multinational corporations could simply uncover further loopholes in the amended 
legislation to exploit in order to reduce their tax burdens. 
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